BOMBARDMENT OF YARMOUTH AND LOWESTOFT
On April 24, 1916, the High Seas Fleet set
out on an expedition intended to lure heavy
British forces out of port and into battle
in conditions advantageous to the Germans.
The German ships were to bombard towns on
the southeast coast of England on daybreak
of the 25th, which along with air raids by
zeppelins the night before would prompt the
British units to intervene. The British had
strong forces in the North Sea, off Norway,
and another strong force in Hoofden and off
the southeast coast of England. The Germans
would sneak out between the two forces to
bombard the English coast, and then the bombardment
force would attack whichever British force
showed first. With a little luck, the German
battlecruisers could engage the southeast
force, and after defeating it would run back
to the northwest, meeting the northern group
in the area around Terschelling Bank. Here
the battlecruisers would attack the second
British group from the south, and the main
body of the High Seas Fleet would attack
it from the north. If successful, the High
Seas Fleet would be able to destroy significant
elements of the British fleet before the
main body of the Grand Fleet could assist,
reducing or eliminating the Royal Navy's
numerical superiority. If the British did
not take the bait, then merchant ships could
be captured and British units off the coast
of Belgium destroyed.
Lowestoft and Yarmouth were selected as the
targets of the bombardment. Lowestoft was
a base of operations for mine laying and
sweeping, while Yarmouth was a base for the
submarines that disrupted German movements
in the Heligoland Bight. The destruction
of the harbors and other military establishments
of both these coastal towns would assist
the German war effort even if the raid failed
to bait the British heavy units. Eight zeppelins
would, after dropping their bombs, provide
recognizance for the battlecruisers, which
would in turn provide rescue operations should
an airship be lost over the water. Two U-boats
were sent out ahead of time to Lowestoft,
while others were stationed off, or strew
mines in, the Firth of Forth.
The battlecruisers Seydlitz, Lutzow, Derfflinger,
Moltke and Von der Tann, commanded by Rear-Admiral
Bödicker, would be supported by the six light
cruisers of Scouting Division II and two
fast torpedo-boat flotillas (VI and IX).
The Main Fleet, consisting of Squadrons I,
II and III, Scouting Division IV, and the
remainder of the torpedo flotillas was to
accompany the battle-cruisers to the Hoofden
until the bombardment was over, in order,
if necessary, to protect them against superior
enemy forces.
At noon on the 24th all the forces were in
place and the operation began. The course
led around British minefields to the English
coast, and was intended to put the bombardment
group off Lowestoft and Yarmouth at daybreak,
where they would bombard the towns for 30
minutes. But at 4 P.M. the battlecruiser
Seydlitz, in the van of the recognizance
force, struck a mine in an area swept the
night before. She was forced to turn back
with a flooded torpedo compartment, being
only able to make 15 knots with 1400 tons
of water on board and 11 men killed. While
the rest of the squadron hove to, and Seydlitz
extracted herself from the minefield, the
German ships sighted, and avoided, torpedoes
from one or more British submarines; the
element of surprise was lost. Rather than
call off the mission, the rest of the battlecruiser
force altered course to take the route along
the coast of East Friesland, a course previously
avoided because with the clear weather, the
ships would be sighted from the islands of
Rottum and Schiermonnikoog and their movements
reported to the British.
Around 8 PM a message from the Naval Staff
confirmed that the British Fleet was still
divided into two sections, and giving rise
to optimism that the operation would go off
as planned despite the mining of Seydlitz.
At 9.30 P.M. another message from the Naval
Staff indicated that all British patrol boats
were heading back to harbor, as sure sign
that the British submarine(s) had reported
the German movements.
The German airships, after dropping their
bombs, reported back to the bombardment force:
visibility over land was poor, the winds
were unfavorable, and the towns were better
defended than previously thought: the zeppelins
bombing Norwich, Lincoln, Harwich and Ipswich
and had been taken under fire by British
ships, but none had been damaged.
At 5 A.M. the German battlecruisers approached
the coast off Lowestoft. The light cruiser
Rostock, providing flank cover for the battlecruisers,
reported enemy ships and destroyers in a
west-southwest direction. But it was not
yet light enough to engage these ships, or
vice-versa, Admiral Bödicker decided to proceed
with the bombardment of the towns. The German
ships reported seeing "excellent results"
and that return fire was weak. The bombardment
group then turned northwest to bombard Yarmouth'
and to engage the ships reported by the Rostock.
Rostock and the light cruiser Elbing had
tried to lead the British ships, four light
cruisers and about twelve destroyers, into
the waiting guns of the battlecruisers. But
upon sighting the German capital ships, the
British cruisers turned south to put distance
between themselves and the German force.
The German battlecruisers opened fire, causing
severe damage to the cruiser Conquest and
the destroyer Laertes and slightly damaging
one other light cruiser. The Germans then
ceased fire and turned northwest towards
the rendezvous point off Terschelling Bank,
hoping the British cruisers would follow,
which they did not.
During the bombardment of the two coastal
towns, the light cruiser Frankfurt sank an
armed patrol steamer, while the leader of
Torpedo-boat Flotilla VI, "G41,"
sank a second. The crews were rescued and
taken prisoner.
Around 7.30 A.M. the German Naval Staff reported
that intercepted wireless transmission indicated
the British ships assembled off the southeast
coast of England had been instructed not
to intercept the Germans. Nor would the northern
British forces attempt to intercept the German
battlecruisers at Terschelling Bank (the
Grand Fleet had put to sea on exercises the
day before, and was returning to base low
on coal), and British forces off the Belgian
coast made themselves scarce: the Royal Navy
would not fall into the German trap.
As the German ships headed for home, they
dodged submarine attacks, encountering only
two neutral steamers and some fishing vessels.
The operation had been almost a complete
failure, netting only two patrol craft sunk,
one cruiser and one destroyer damaged, in
exchange for serious damage to a battlecruiser,
while the actual damage done to the naval
establishments at Yarmouth and Lowestoft
was light.
The raid infuriated the British, and cost
the Germans heavily in the court of world
opinion, as the operation brought back memories
of the 'baby killer' raids earlier in the
war. British casualties were 21 servicemen
killed on warships, and 4 civilians killed
and 19 wounded on land.