The Sinking of the Kongo

After the failure of Operation "SHO-1-GO" to destroy the American amphibious forces of Leyte, and which instead led to the Imperial Japanese Navy suffering grievous losses, the surviving units of Vice-Admiral Kurita's force returned to Brunei Bay, where they were re-designated the First Striking Force and held in readiness to offer what support they could to General Suzuki's XXXV Army on Leyte. Apart from one abortive sortie from 8 to 11 November in a vain attempt to divert American attention from the TA-3 and TA-4 reinforcement convoys carrying the 26th Infantry Division from Manila to Ormoc, the force remained virtually inactive in Brunei Bay for almost 3 weeks.

The ships spent this time making what emergency repairs they could to damage suffered in the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October, off Samar on the 25th and during the withdrawal on the 26th, while awaiting instructions from Naval HQ in Tokyo where they were to go next. Actually, the Naval General Staff had already made this decision quite early, but took quite some time to communicate it to Kurita. As early as 4 November an inspection team led by Rear-Admirals Yagasaki Masatsume and Iwasaki Wasaburo of the Manila Technical Department had completed its work and made its recommendations both to Tokyo and Admiral Kurita.

The degrees of damage to individual ships basically determined their destinations. Of the battleships, it was deemed necessary for Yamato, Nagato and Kongo to return to Japan for the full repair of battle damage; only Haruna was fit for duty, and could be deployed to Singapore.
On 25 October, during the air attacks by the CVE task units and one task group from Task Force 38, Kongo had suffered significant, if not serious, damage. Around 1330 she had been bracketed by 6 near-misses that shook her heavily; a gash was torn in the anti-torpedo blister on the starboard side abreast the bridge, which opened up fifteen oil tanks to the sea. Another near miss off the starboard quarter had damaged the blades of both starboard propellers.

Kongo had lost 307 tons of oil fuel, had three 25mm mountings wrecked, and had suffered 12 men killed and 36 wounded by bomb-fragments.

Yamato suffered bomb damage in the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October that led to her shipping 3000 tons of seawater and taking on a 5-degree list to port; counter-flooding reduced the list to 1 degree, but she remained down by the bow by 0.8m (2ft 8in). During the withdrawal on 26 October she sustained a further 2 bomb hits.

Nagato was struck by 7 bombs in the Sibuyan Sea, two of which holed her below the waterline. She suffered two more bomb hits on 25 October.

On 15 November Combined Fleet ordered a major reorganization of what was left of IJN. Vice-Admiral Ugaki Matome's 1st Squadron was disbanded, with Yamato being designated as flagship of the Second Fleet and Nagato being transferred to 3rd Squadron with Haruna and Kongo. Vice-Admiral Ozawa's Mobile Force was abolished, and the now non-existent 3rd Carrier Division was disbanded, along with 4th and 7th Squadrons (heavy cruiser). The 1st and 10th Destroyer Flotillas were disbanded, their survivors being incorporated into the now much-enlarged 2nd Flotilla.

The Second Striking Force, hitherto the Fifth Fleet, would go to Singapore, while most of the ships of the First Striking Force would return home to Japan.

This last movement was to be carried out immediately: Kurita was to take Yamato, Nagato and Kongo home for repairs as soon as they were refuelled, which meant a departure during the afternoon of the following day, 16 November.

At 1820 on the 16th the order went out from Yamato for the homeward-bound ships to weigh and proceed. Light cruiser Yahagi led the way, followed by Kongo, then Nagato, with the majestic Yamato bringing up the rear. The destroyer screen was thin, but experienced: the four veterans of the 17th Destroyer Group - Hamakaze, Isokaze, Urakaze and Yukikaze.

Left behind, and scheduled to sail the next day for Singapore, was battleship Haruna. The crews of Haruna and Kongo regarded this separation with some unease, as the pair had been almost constant companions since the beginning of the war, and this was the first time the two had parted company in a combat zone.

The two sisters would never see each other again.

Kurita's force set course northwest past the Pratas Islands (southeast of Hong Kong) thence towards the Straits of Formosa. Around noon on 20 November the force entered the Straits between the Pescadores Islands and the southern point of Formosa. The escort destroyers Kiri and Ume, which had briefly reinforced the screen, detached at this stage and proceeded to Mako.
The light cruiser and the three battleships were still in column, zig-zagging at 16 knots, with Hamakaze and Isokaze screening to port and Urakaze and Yukikaze to starboard. Kurita no doubt wished he could proceed at a higher speed, but he was compelled to maintain an economical cruising speed to conserve valuable fuel.

After sunset the night was dark and cloudy, with moonlight shining dimly through gaps in the clouds on a dark sea. Shortly before midnight, enemy radar was detected on a bearing between north and 070 degrees; it could not be determined whether the emissions were from an aircraft or - worse - a submarine. Staff officers pondered on what best action to take; Kurita eventually decided on a course alteration to 050 degrees. The order was passed to all ships, and the destroyers were told to be exceptionally vigilant for signs of submarine activity. Speed was maintained at 16 knots.

As Tuesday 21 November arrived, visibility was still fair, with the horizon just discernible from the dark sky. To starboard, some 60 miles distant loomed the mountains of Formosa. As the force moved on the bearing of the radar signals drew left, gradually moving astern as the ships steamed northeast. By 0230 it seemed fairly certain that the emitter was an aircraft, for if it were a submarine the signal would have ceased abruptly as it dived to commence an attack.
Unknown to the Japanese, the radar signals came not from an aircraft, but were indeed from a submarine. She was USS Sealion II (SS-315), under the command of 34-year-old Lieutenant-Commander Eli T. Reich. She had been on patrol near the northern tip of Formosa when at 0020 her radar had detected three unusually large contacts off the starboard quarter at the incredible range of 44,000 yards.

At first Reich thought his radar signals were bouncing off Formosa, but by 0048 the range had closed to 32,000 yards and was assessed as, "Two targets of battleship proportions and two of large cruiser size, course 060 true, speed 16 knots, not zigging."

Reich sent an immediate contact report to Pearl Harbour, and came about for an end-run. The night was now overcast and moonless, the sea was fairly calm, and the wind was rising. Visibility from the submarine's conning tower was a bare 1500 yards; nevertheless, Reich decided to chase and attack on the surface.

This was an unusual decision in an encounter with surface units, for Sealion would be running the risk of being detected herself by enemy radar (and apparently already had been, by Yamato) and then of finding herself on the wrong end of well-aimed salvoes. However, Reich knew that he would need all the speed he could muster if he were to get into an attacking position ahead of the enemy, and the only way that could be achieved was on the surface.

Sealion increased to full speed and commenced her end-run. By 0146, in increasing wind and seas, she was parallel to the enemy on the port beam; her radar now showed 4 heavy ships in line - cruiser, battleship, battleship, cruiser - escorted by three destroyers, one 1800 yards off either bow of the leading battleship and a third on her starboard quarter. The ships were still not zigzagging and were steaming on course 057, apparently blissfully unaware of the submarine as she gradually edged out ahead.

Completely ignorant of the mighty guns he was in fact challenging, Reich was in a perfect attack position at 0245. Sealion slowed, and turned in to make her attacking run on the enemy's port bow. Selecting the second ship in line - the first battleship - as his target, Reich kept his bow pointed at the nearest destroyer (Isokaze) which the conning-tower lookouts could now dimly make out some 1800 yards away. This was the first visual contact with an enemy during a chase that until then had been conducted entirely on radar information.

Noting that the destroyers tended to overlap on radar with the battleships, Reich set his torpedo depths at 8 feet, hoping that he might hit a destroyer as well. This decision was to have an interesting consequence.

At 0256 Reich came to a heading of 168 degrees and fired all 6 bow electric torpedoes on a 90-degree track at a range of 3000 yards. As the torpedoes left the tubes, the bridge quartermaster reported that he could make out a high, pagoda-like superstructure on the target - definitely a battleship.

Reich then came right under full rudder to a westerly heading for a stern shot, and at 0259:30 fired three torpedoes from the stern tubes at a range of 3100 yards and a depth setting of 10 feet. The target was the third ship in column, the second battleship (Nagato). As the last torpedo left its tube, Reich called for flank speed and headed due west to clear the area as quickly as possible.

With the weather worsening, the bridge crews and lookouts in the Japanese ships had relaxed slightly as a submarine attack under those conditions seemed less likely. There was considerable surprise and consternation, therefore, when at 0301 there was a sudden flash of dim flame and a large column of water shot up the side of Kongo; alarms sounded even as a second flash followed, perhaps more.

Nagato and Yamato immediately put their helms hard to port to comb any more torpedoes that might be approaching, and by doing so deprived Reich of a two-battleship score. His second salvo crossed ahead of Nagato and continued eastward.

While it might have missed its intended target, this second salvo still scored - on the leading destroyer of the starboard screen, Urakaze, leader of the 17th Destroyer Group. At 0134, just as the destroyer was probably preparing her depth-charges and getting ready for anti-submarine action, she was hit on the port side by the third torpedo of Sealion's second salvo aimed at Nagato.

There was a brilliant "circle of light" and a series of "lesser detonations" as Urakaze was blown apart. Perhaps the torpedo had struck her in the forward magazine, or detonated her own torpedoes amidships; whatever the case, within two minutes she had vanished.

Her sudden demise was misinterpreted by her consorts as having been a result of an attack from the east, as she had been on that side of the formation. Yukikaze, the other destroyer to starboard, immediately began dropping depth-charges to the eastward of where Urakaze had been - an understandable reaction under the circumstances.

Two of Sealion's six torpedoes had caught Kongo. One struck in the port bow cable locker, tearing a large gash in the bow, the other abreast her after funnel, flooding Nos.6 and 8 boiler rooms. The remaining boilers could provide adequate pressure, however, and Kongo was able to maintain 16 knots. Nevertheless, she slowly developed a list to port which was not corrected.

Nagato and Yamato completed their evasive circles to port and, seeing that Kongo was still under way, resumed formation. While still in her turn Yamato had seen a burst of light where Urakaze was supposed to be, and contact had now been lost with her. Kurita and his staff suspected the worst, but there was no thought of stopping to search for survivors with a damaged battleship to worry about. Order gradually returned and, encouraged by reports from Kongo, the ships returned to their base course of northeast.

Although a considerable length of her port side and machinery spaces aft were flooded, there was little initial concern among Kongo's veteran crew. The men were combat-experienced and well-trained, and there was no panic or even much excitement. Many men actually turned in again as the battleship pounded onward.

After receiving a full report from the battleship's captain, Rear-Admiral Shimazaki Toshio, the 3rd Squadron commander, Vice-Admiral Suzuki Yoshio, signalled the details to Kurita in Yamato. Once it was assumed that Kongo's damage appeared manageable, the decision was made to maintain speed and escape any pursuit by the enemy.

This was a wise decision, for Sealion was indeed giving chase. From the conning tower, Reich was chagrined to learn that the enemy force, now 8000 yards to the east, was continuing on at 16 knots, and that apparently his shallow depth-setting had only dented the battleships. As unaware as the Japanese that he had already sunk Urakaze, Reich feared that he had erred in being greedy with the shallow setting, and decided that another attack was necessary.

As his torpedomen rushed to reload the tubes, Sealion set off in hot pursuit at full speed into the teeth of the steadily-mounting gale which had now increased to about Force 5 or 6. Solid water was breaking over the bridge and pouring down the conning-tower hatch, but Reich drove his boat onward at 17 knots.

The Japanese were by now aware that Sealion was in pursuit. They had picked up Sealion's radar waves again, and at about 0405 the force began to zig-zag. Yamato was tracking the enemy submarine and was ready to open fire if necessary, but Kurita decided the best chance of avoiding further harm was to maintain course and speed.

However, the worsening weather was complicating things for the Japanese. While it was true that the torpedo hits on Kongo had inflicted moderate to severe initial damage that seemed under control, her maintaining speed after the hits meant that the increasing pressure of inrushing water began to buckle already-weakened bulkheads. This aggravated the damage, and made the work of damage-control parties that much harder.

As the force drove northeast in the heavy seas, the hole in Kongo's bow was being wrenched wider. Divers assigned to sealing the hole fearlessly donned their gear and set about their task in the flooded compartments, but each pitch of the battleship brought more flooding. The damage control officer suspected that the torpedoes had torn open the torpedo bulge, and that the tear was getting bigger all the time.

Despite the danger of being subjected to a second attack, Kongo had no choice; first she had to cease zig-zagging, then she had to slow to 14 or even 12 knots.

As she lost speed Nagato overtook her, sending blinkered messages of encouragement and assurance. The mood on board Kongo remained cautiously optimistic. Her list had been checked at 12 degrees, and the reduction in speed seemed to have temporarily stemmed the flow of water through the holes in her side.

"Temporarily" was the optimum word. Soon after, Shimazaki eyed the inclinometer with growing concern as the list to port began to slowly but surely increase, indicating that the flooding was not being adequately checked. Damage control crews soon confirmed what was becoming obvious: progressive flooding was spreading through leaks, fractured bulkheads, sprung seams and pipes throughout the ship's 32-year-old hull. Still, no thought was given to the possibility that Kongo might actually sink. The only question seemed to be whether she should try to remain with the formation or make for Formosa for emergency repairs.

At 14 degrees the list slowed, then stopped once more. The good news was passed to the flagship. Nevertheless, it was now 90 minutes since the hits and Shimazaki's mind was made up: he asked Kurita for permission to proceed to the nearest port in Formosa. After consultation with his staff and Admiral Suzuki, Kurita ordered Shimazaki to proceed to Keelung, some 65 miles distant. After effecting emergency repairs, Kongo was to resume passage to Japan. The destroyers Hamakaze and Isokaze were detached to screen her, and to stand by should the worst-case scenario eventuate.

At 0440 turned to the east, toward Keelung, with the destroyers on either beam. The remainder of the force, now screened only by Yukikaze, increased speed and maintained course for Japan. Vice-Admiral Suzuki decided against transferring his flag, opting to remain on board Kongo.

At a steady 10 knots Kongo headed for Keelung as the heavy seas continued to surge into her torn hull; at that speed she should make Keelung in 6 hours. However, Kongo did not have 6 hours left - she did not even have 1.

Despite the heroic efforts of her damage control teams and even the sacrifices of divers, they were unable to effectively shore up the gashes in her hull. Not long after separating from her consorts, Kongo's list to port began to increase again, going beyond 20 degrees.

To compensate, Shimazaki ordered that all hands who could do so were to move to the starboard side. The bow was now dipping deeper into the sea, and it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a steady course. To make matters worse, the destroyers reported that the strength of the enemy radar transmissions was increasing, indicating that the submarine was getting closer.

It became obvious to Vice-Admiral Suzuki that the submarine was more intent on finishing off his wounded prey than pursuing the rest of the force. At least the weather would be making pursuit difficult for the submarine, and there was still a chance that Kongo might be saved. The destroyers manoeuvred to stay between the submarine and their charge, but wondered why the American had not already attacked.

It mattered not, for Sealion's pursuit was not the greater menace. Fifteen minutes after turning for Keelung Kongo's list suddenly increased to 45 degrees. Hasty flooding of starboard-side compartments was either too late or the valves and pumps did not work properly, for the engine rooms were now flooding and speed was falling off.

By 0518 Kongo was dead in the water and unnavigable. A suggestion that the destroyers attempt a tow was quickly disregarded: the seas were too high and the battleship was too waterlogged. On the bridge, the grim truth was now clear to Shimazaki and Suzuki: Kongo was sinking. If confirmation were needed, in came with the report that the damage control officer had committed ritual suicide in frustration and shame with his failure.

Reluctantly, Shimazaki gave the order for all hands to prepare to abandon ship. At 0552, with stoic calm and discipline, the men began to go over the side as the destroyers closed the high starboard side to take men off. Countering a possible submarine attack was now of secondary importance; the essential task was to rescue as many of Kongo's men as possible.

Sealion watched all this on radar. Reich had watched with gratified amazement as the battleship they had damaged was seen to slow down, and at 0520 go dead in the water. The battleship's echo seemed to be shrinking; this was puzzling, but irrelevant. Unable to see the state of the enemy and the rescue operations that were going on, Reich began closing for a third attack. It was not required.

Men were still going over her starboard side when Kongo began to roll onto her beam-ends; then, as the list passed 60 degrees, a greater disaster struck.

At 0524 the forward 14-inch magazines suddenly exploded. Reich wrote of a "žsky brilliantly illuminated - it looked like sunset at night." Pieces of metal and men were flung skyward in all directions. Hamakaze and Isokaze escaped destruction only because the force of the explosion was vented upwards and to port - not to starboard, in their direction.

Within a minute the shattered remains of Kongo had disappeared.

When the shock of the catastrophe had passed, the destroyers signalled the news to Yamato, then set about searching for any survivors that might still be alive in the water. It was feared that given the suddenness of the final capsize and the tremendous blast the loss of life would be extremely heavy, if not total.

The destroyers worked through the whole morning, but their efforts yielded meagre results. Urakaze picked up 146 survivors, Isokaze 91. Neither Suzuki nor Shimazaki was among them; they and some 1250 others had gone down with the ship.

After observing the sudden and unexpected end of his target, Reich did not tarry, but immediately set course north in pursuit of the main group. At 0742 he eventually gave up the chase.

Hamakaze and Isokaze caught up with the main force in the Bungo Straits, where the new destroyers Fuyutsuki and Suzutsuki reinforced the screen. The ships entered the Inland Sea on 23 November; while Yamato proceeded to Kure for docking and repairs, Nagato continued on to Yokosuka for the same purpose.

Both ships would sail only once more: Yamato on a suicide mission to Okinawa in April 1945, Nagato to Eniwetok in March 1946, thence to Bikini Atoll, where she was sunk in the atom-bomb tests in July


Major Source: The Loss of Battleship KONGO: As told in Chapter "November Woes" of "Total Eclipse: The Last Battles of the IJN - Leyte to Kure 1944 to 1945"; A.P. Tully, 1998.