The Battle of Jutland

The Battle of Jutland (known to the Germans as the Battle of the Skagerrak), fought between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet, was the largest naval surface battle in history in terms of the number of ships participating. It was also the only major fleet action of World War One.

Further, the battle played a key role in the demise of the reputation of the battlecruiser, and involved the first use of carrier-based aircraft in battle.

Finally, it was one of the most controversial actions in the long history of the Royal Navy.

The British began the war with a considerable numerical superiority in capital ships over the Germans: 20 "Dreadnought" battleships and 10 battlecruisers against 13 and 4 respectively. In the following 2 years until the Battle of Jutland was fought the British commissioned a further 8 Dreadnoughts and 1 battlecruiser, while the Germans completed only 4 and 3. The Germans realised that they could not hope to win a major fleet action, and so determined to even the odds somewhat by luring smaller parts of the Grand Fleet into "traps" through with the British fleet would be "whittled down" to a size that the High Seas Fleet stood a chance of defeating.

Initially the German C-in-C, Vize-Admiral Scheer, planned to bombard Sunderland to draw out the Grand Fleet, but when inclement weather prevented reconnaissance flights by Zeppelins he was forced to come up with an alternative. He planned to send the battlecruiser force (1st Scouting Force) under Vize-Admiral Hipper into the Skagerrak (the sea between Denmark and Norway) to threaten British patrols and merchant shipping in the area.

On the morning of 30 May the High Seas Fleet sailed.

By the morning of 30 May the British had received indications that the ships of the German fleet were concentrating, and this along with increased U-boat activity and a decoded (but not interpreted) operational signal led the British to suppose that the High Seas Fleet was about to put to sea. At that time Admiral Jellicoe with the main part of the Grand Fleet of 24 battleships and 3 battlecruisers was at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys with some units at Cromarty; Vice-Admiral Beatty, with 6 battlecruisers and 4 "fast battleships" ("Queen Elizabeth" Class) of the 5th Battle Squadron was further south in the Firth of Forth.

At 5.40pm on the 30th Jellicoe was informed by the Admiralty that there was unusual German activity and that "¼the Germans intend some operations commencing tomorrow." By 11pm that evening the entire operational strength of the Grand Fleet was at sea, and Jellicoe had ordered Beatty to a rendezvous 90 miles west of the entrance to the Skagerrak.
Hipper's 5 battlecruisers sailed from the River Jade at 1am on 31 May, with orders to make their presence known off Norway and hopefully draw out Beatty's battlecruisers into the guns of Scheer's battleships which would be some 60 miles astern of Hipper.

Of the 10 U-boats positioned off the British bases, only 2 sighted made sightings: U-32 reported 2 battleships, 2 cruisers and several destroyers, while U-66 reported 8 battleships, light cruisers and destroyers. The Germans did not interpret these sightings as meaning the whole Grand Fleet was at sea.

During the forenoon of 31 May, Jellicoe received intelligence from the Admiralty that the German flagship, SMS Friedrich der Grosse, was still in port; this led him to believe that the German operation was principally a sweep by battlecruisers with the High Seas Fleet providing only distant cover. When he later found that this was not the case, his confidence in the intelligence with which he was being provided was badly shaken, which was to have significant consequences in the ensuing battle.

In the early afternoon of 31 May Beatty's battlecruisers (Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger, Indefatigable and New Zealand) were on a course that would take them - at about 4.30pm - 40 miles astern of the German battlecruisers (Lützow [flag], Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke and von der Tann) and 20 miles ahead of Scheer's battleships. Fortunately for Beatty, the Danish steamer N.J. Fjord was steaming between the cruiser screens of both battlecruiser fleets; at 2pm she was sighted by the German cruiser Elbing, and the destroyers B-109 and B0110 were sent to investigate. At almost the same time, Beatty ordered the light cruisers Galatea and Phaeton on the same task.
At 3.20pm Galatea signalled "Enemy in sight", and 8 minutes later she and Phaeton opened fire.

Beatty immediately turned his battlecruisers south-south-east to engage the enemy, but owing to a combination of bad initial positioning, sloppy signalling, lack of initiative and bad luck the powerful ships of the 5th Battle Squadron - Barham, Malaya, Valiant and Warspite - turned in the other direction and steamed on for nearly 10 minutes. Thus they steadily opened the range, depriving Beatty of the most powerful in the world during the early part of the battle.

At 3.38pm (GMT) the German battlecruisers opened fire, followed within a minute by the British. Again poor signalling acted against Beatty's ships, and for the first vital 10 minutes of the exchange 4 of the British battlecruisers were firing on only 2 of the Germans.

Beatty's flagship, Lion, initially engaged Lützow, although Derfflinger and the light cruisers Wiesbaden and Pillau were also fired at. Altogether, in the battle Lion fired a total of 326 rounds of 13.5-inch armour-piercing shell, but scored only 4 hits on Lützow and 1 on Derfflinger. In return she received 9 hits by 12-inch shells from port and a further 4 later from starboard. The most damaging of these was one of those from port, which struck "Q" turret and forced the flooding of the magazine to prevent a catastrophic explosion.
Princess Royal, the second ship in the British line, also fired mainly on Lützow, although she, too, briefly engaged Derfflinger and eventually Seydlitz. She was credited with 3 hits on Lützow and 2 on Seydlitz, but took 8 hits from 12-inch shells and 1 from 11-inch herself.

The third ship in Beatty's line, Queen Mary, is believed to have expended about 150 rounds of 13.5-inch armour-piercing shell and scoring 4 hits on Seydlitz. It is impossible to say exactly what led to Queen Mary being blown up, but it is thought she was hit by about 4 11-inch shells from Seydlitz in the first half-hour, including a hit on the after 4-inch battery and perhaps another near "X" turret. It is possible that there was considerable damage in the 4-inch battery, including an ammunition fire that was observed from Seydlitz. About 5 minutes before she blew up she took a 12-inch hit from Derfflinger on "Q" turret which put the right gun out of action although the left gun continued firing. This hit was followed another two from Derfflinger, one of which was on "A" or "B" turret and the other perhaps on the left gun of "Q" turret. A subsequent explosion in either "A" or "B" turret shook the ship and hydraulic pressure failed in "Q" turret. Immediately afterwards "A" and "B" magazines exploded, blowing the ship in two.

The forward part sank immediately; the after part, with the stern clear of the water and the screws still turning, remained afloat briefly until another explosion blew it up.

Next astern, Tiger fired a total of 313 13.5-inch shells and scored only 3 hits - all in the first 35 minutes and 1 of which was on Molke while the other 2 were on von der Tann. Like her consorts, she received more than she gave, taking 14 11-inch hits from port and another from starboard.

New Zealand fired more heavy shells - 420 - than any ship in either fleet, but it was not until the second and final phase of the battle that she eventually scored a hit a Seydlitz and another on the pre-Dreadnought Schleswig-Holstein.

Indefatigable was hardly that, being hit once early in the action and then by 2 shells near "X" turret. An explosion followed and she began to settle by the stern; she was then hit by 2 more shells, and after an appreciable interval blew up.

It was not until 4.03pm that Rear-Admiral Evans-Thomas' powerful fast-battleships opened fire, immediately scoring hits on Moltke and von der Tann.

While the capital ships were slugging it out, the opposing destroyer forces were also engaging each other; the British Nomad and German V-29 were sunk by gunfire while V-27 was torpedoed by Petard and Turbulent.

During this engagement by the opposing battlecruiser forces, Hipper had been heading south towards Scheer's battleships, and at 4.30 light cruiser Southampton sighted the German battle fleet. This was a nasty surprise for Beatty, who, like Jellicoe, had been led to believe the German ships were still in port!

To escape the certain destruction of his ships Beatty turned north, thus ending the first phase of the battle, known as "The Run to the South". The British battlecruisers had scored only 11 hits while receiving 42 and losing 2 of their number; the 5th Battle Squadron scored 6 hits and received 2; the German battlecruisers scored 48 hits and received 17.

The "first round" had most definitely gone to the Germans!


At 4.46 the leading German battleships opened fire on the fleeing (withdrawing?) British ships at 21,000 yards, but the shells fell short. The German VI Torpedo Boat Squadron mad an unsuccessful torpedo attack, as did the British destroyers Nestor and Nicator on the German battlecruisers, Nestor being sunk in the process.

By thus stage the visible had considerably deteriorated, and there was a great deal of smoke from gunfire and the crippled destroyers. As a result, firing by both sides became sporadic during the brief intervals in which targets could be seen. Beatty's battlecruisers were steadily drawing away from the Germans, so Hipper's battlecruisers concentrated on the 5th Battle Squadron, over which they enjoyed a few knots' speed advantage. The British battleships received several hits, none of them serious, while returning fire extremely effective, knocking out one turret in Seydlitz and causing a cordite fire in another.

At 5.33 the outer screens of Jellicoe's and Beatty's forces sighted each other, but despite this at 6.10 Jellicoe was still unsure of the exact whereabouts of the German fleet and his ships were still in cruising - not battle - formation!

Whilst Beatty had been engaged, the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron (Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable), which had been temporarily attached to the Grand Fleet for gunnery practice at Scapa Flow, had raced ahead of Jellicoe to join Beatty but had not found him.

At 5.27 the light cruiser Chester was "ambushed" by German light cruisers, which had intercepted British signals. Fortunately for Chester, the 3rd BCS intervened from the northeast, taking the Germans by surprise. Wiesbaden was disabled by Invincible, while Regensburg crippled the destroyer Shark.

This intervention by 3BCS was crucial, in that it distracted the Germans while Jellicoe belatedly deployed his ships in line-of-battle and prevented Scheer from "crossing the T" of the Grand Fleet.

The armoured cruisers Defence and Warrior attempted to finish off Wiesbaden, but were themselves hammered by the German battleships. Defence was sunk, but the badly-damaged Warrior managed to withdrew towards the 5th Battle squadron.

The Germans then turned their attention on the fast battleships, and a hit on Warspite jammed her rudder, causing her to circle twice in front of the German line. She took 13 hits before she was able to extricate herself from "Windy Corner".

By 6.22pm 3BCS had joined Beatty, and the combined battlecruiser force was maintaining a heavy fire on the German van. Invincible had scored 8 hits on Lützow when she herself came under fire from both Lützow and Derfflinger. A shell from the former blew the top off "Q" turret, the flash of ignited propellant then reaching the magazine which exploded. The ship was blown in two, the bow and stern remaining above water for some time like two-half-tide rocks.


Prior to this, however, Invincible and Inflexible (mostly the former) had scored 8 hits on Lützow while Indomitable scored 3 on Derfflinger and 1 on Seydlitz. The hits on Lützow were significant, as they represented the greatest British success of the battle by inflicting the damage which eventually proved fatal to Lützow. This was caused by 2 shells which hit below the waterline in or near the forward broadside torpedo flat, the resultant flooding putting the ship out of action.

At 6.30pm, before Jellicoe's battleships had completed deploying into battle formation, the van of the German force came into view and the British ships opened fire. The Germans responded by executing a manoeuvre that completely astonished the British: each battleship executed a simultaneous 180-degree turn, disappearing into the smoke. At the same time Scheer sent his destroyers to carry out a torpedo attack and lay smoke to further confuse Jellicoe's gunners.

Lützow, however, was not able to keep up with the withdrawing fleet, and Hipper transferred his flag to the destroyer G-39.

The Grand Fleet did not at first notice the Germans' turn, although light cruiser Falmouth witnessed it without reporting it. It was not until 6.44pm that Jellicoe altered course in an attempt to intercept the Germans.

At 6.55pm Scheer ordered another simultaneous 180-degeree turn which, unknowingly, took him heading directly towards the centre of the British battle formation. Consequently the German van came under hammering fire from the British battleships.

At 7.13pm Scheer ordered his battlecruisers to cover the withdrawal of the German battleships, and 2 minutes later sent his destroyers in for a torpedo attack. Then, at 7.18, he ordered a third 180-degree simultaneous turn by his battleships.

This was the most difficult of the three. It was executed in poor visibility the German line had become somewhat disorganised, and as a consequence Scheer's battleships sustained many hits. Nevertheless, the Germans successfully executed the turn.

In carrying out Scheer's orders the German battlecruisers suffered considerable damage, and were saved from almost certain destruction only by the torpedo attacks by the III, VI and IX Torpedo Boat Flotillas.

Jellicoe was twice forced to turn his ships away from the fleeing German battleships by the torpedo attacks, and the High Sea Fleet was soon lost to sight in the gathering gloom. It has been said that had Jellicoe turned towards the German Fleet instead of away during the torpedo attacks, he would have inflicted heavy losses on Scheer's ships, possibly even routed them - or at the very least annihilated the German battlecruisers.

(While he was heavily criticised for turning away, Jellicoe had earlier in the war told the Admiralty that this would be his plan in such an event and Their Lords had endorsed it.)


Jellicoe was now unaware of the position of the High Seas Fleet; while Beatty signalled the enemy's position at 7.40pm this was not received by Jellicoe until 8.07. He then set course for Horn's Reef, which he guessed was Scheer's destination, hoping to resume the battle at first light next day.

As the daylight faded there were a number of skirmishes between the opposing light forces, the capital ships being reluctant to intervene because of the difficulty in determining friend from foe.

At 8.20 Beatty sighted and opened fire again on Hipper, both sides scoring hits before the Germans turned away. Just as this occurred the German II Squadron of pre-Dreadnoughts came into view and also took numerous hits from the British battlecruisers before turning away. Beatty did not follow, and thus ended the last engagement between capital ships of the war.

At this point the two battle lines were actually on converging courses, but despite the British being able to see the Germans while remaining obscured themselves Jellicoe ordered the Grand Fleet to turn away rather than get involved in a night action. He was concerned by the poor standard of British night-fighting skills, and was especially worried about the danger of torpedo attacks. The results of the night skirmishes that did take place show this to be have been one of Jellicoe's wiser decisions in the battle.

As anticipated, Scheer set course for Horn's Reef, then sent out his torpedo boats to make night attacks. They failed to find their prey.

Jellicoe ordered his ships into a defensive night formation and course for Ems, his latest guess at Scheer's destination, even though Horn's Reef was a shorter route. He left his destroyers to guard Horn's Reef.

From 9.50pm onwards there was a series of light cruiser and destroyers clashes. I general these were fought at close range (around 1000 yards), and the Germans usually got the first shots in. Both sides sustained damaged, but the only ship sunk was the light cruiser Frauenlob, torpedoes by HMS Southampton.

Just after midnight both Moltke and Seydlitz crossed the rear of the British fleet. Both were sighted, but they were left unchallenged as the British battleships were afraid to reveal themselves, thereby losing a golden opportunity to sink both ships.

The British 4th Destroyer Flotilla encountered the German van, Westfalen sinking Tipperary and Spitfire colliding with Nassau. In the confusion light cruiser Elbing was rammed by the battleship Posen, and later sank.

At 11.40pm the large destroyer Broke challenged the cruiser Rostock; the German replied with gunfire, hitting Broke and jamming her rudder. Broke then sliced off 30 feet of Sparrowhawk's stern, but the British exacted their revenge by sinking Rostock for the loss of Fortune, sunk by Westfalen.

The armoured cruiser Black Prince, which had become separated from the rest of her squadron, encountered the German battle fleet just after midnight and was literally blown out of the water by the concentrated fire of 4 battleships. Westfalen scored again, sinking destroyer Ardent.

These actions were seen by the 5th Battle Squadron, but the fact that the German battleships were crossing astern of the Grand Fleet was not reported to Jellicoe as it was assumed he knew.

Jellicoe had in fact received a report from the Admiralty at 11.30pm saying that the Germans were heading for Horn's Reef, but because of the false "intelligence" previously provided Jellicoe ignored this latest report.

The 9th and 10th Destroyer Flotillas joined up with what was left of the 4th Flotilla and crossed the German line, thinking it was the 5th Battle Squadron. Again Westfalen got into the action, sinking Turbulent and damaging Petard. The remaining destroyers failed to carry out a torpedo attack or inform Jellicoe of the encounter.

Only the 12th Destroyer Flotilla now lay between the Germans and their escape route. They sighted the enemy and endeavoured to signal Jellicoe, but their wireless transmissions were jammed by the Germans. At 2.05am the destroyers carried out a torpedo attack, sinking the old battleship Pommern.

Around 4am the High Seas Fleet passed Horn's Reef, and that afternoon the ships were safely back in port. Jellicoe was unaware that the Germans had got ahead of him, and it was not until 4.15am that he realised the latest "intelligence" from the Admiralty had been correct.

Jutland was undoubtedly a tactical and material victory for the Germans, whilst the British achieved a pyrrhic strategic victory. The Germans had inflicted heavier losses on the numerically superior Grand Fleet and had escaped near destruction, but they failed to break the British blockade or control of the North Sea and had not altered the strategic balance in any way.

The Royal Navy, on the other hand, had failed to achieve a second Trafalgar and missed numerous opportunities to inflict heavier casualties on the Germans. Despite its losses and damage, the Grand Fleet was ready for sea again before the High Seas - and still in vastly superior numbers (except for battlecruisers).

Jellicoe had always to bear in mind that the destruction of the High Seas Fleet would not bring Germany to her knees, while a heavy defeat for the Grand Fleet could have knocked Great Britain out of the war. Winston Churchill, a strong critic of Jellicoe, commented that the C-in-C was the only person who could lose the war in a single afternoon.

The Germans showed that they possessed good seamanship skills and their night fighting skills were superior to the British - with starshell, better recognition signalling, superior searchlights and more efficient co-ordination between guns and searchlights.

The Germans' gunnery was also good, with their rangefinders proving superior to the British in determining the initial range but inferior in maintaining it; in general, their fire-control equipment was not as good as the British director system. Overall the British hit rates were greater, despite the poor shooting of Beatty's battlecruisers. Rates of sustained high-calibre fire were similar for both fleets at about 1 round per minute, although on paper the lighter German guns had a higher rate of fire. Visibility - or lack of it - proved to be the crucial factor in the accuracy of both sides.

The British were shown to have several tactical and material flaws. As already mentioned their night-fighting skills were poor, and they also suffered from poor destroyer flotilla torpedo attack tactics.

Worst of all, their enemy contact reporting was atrocious. Jellicoe was repeatedly not provided with vital information that would have enabled him to resume the battle on the morning of 1 June.

Materially, British heavy shells failed to explode when striking armour at oblique angles, something that should have been revealed by testing. This led to many British shells failing to penetrate armour they should have, otherwise the damage to the German ships would have been much greater.

The most crucial material British weakness was cordite instability, with the loss of 3 battlecruisers and 2 armoured cruisers being attributed to this. Hits that penetrated turrets ignited the cordite waiting to be loaded, and the "flash" fires quickly spread to the shell-rooms below causing massive explosions. It has often been stated that British anti-flash arrangements were poor while the Germans had learned of the risk from their experience at Dogger Bank and had improved their arrangements. This is not entirely true; British anti-flash protection was not inferior to that of the Germans, and the only change made by the Germans after Dogger Bank was to reduce the amount of cordite stored in the turrets at any one time.

The main problem with the British flash protection was that in the battlecruisers in particular the safety procedures were not strictly adhered to, with too much cordite being placed outside the powder rooms in unprotected areas and many of the doors designed to keep flash contained being left open.

The reason for this is said to have been the battlecruisers' being "forward deployed" at Rosyth, where there were no safe firing ranges and the ships adopted a policy of sacrificing accuracy for rate of fire. This policy was endorsed from a "senior level" within the battlecruiser force (meaning Beatty's gunnery staff officer, if not Beatty himself), but the R.N. covered this up after the battle and blamed the losses on inferior armour.

The most far-reaching result of Jutland was that it convinced both Scheer and the German Naval Staff that the only way of gaining victory at sea lay in unrestricted submarine warfare. The Germans had fought Jutland as well as or better than could be expected, while the British could only do better.

However, it was not the German submarine blockade of Great Britain that did most to bring the war to an end, but rather the blockade of Germany by the guns of the Grand Fleet.