The Loss of Force Z

On the first day of operations against the British forces in Malaya, the Japanese pressed rapidly inland from their landing sites at Singora, Patani and Kota Bharu, and slashed the RAF's strength by more than half - from more than 110 to less than 50 aircraft. There could be no question, therefore, of British warships remaining idle at their berths while sister Services bore the brunt of the Japanese onslaught.

Churchill's "ultimate deterrent" - battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse - had failed to deter Japanese aggression, and now it had to give battle. Despite a tradition of victories that reached back hundreds of years, Royal Naval officers were now fully aware that they faced desperate odds. The chances of Prince of Wales and Repulse achieving very much against the invaders were slim indeed, and the risks the ships ran in attempting a high-speed dash to the invasion areas were very great: any chance of success depended solely on the ships' reaching their objective undetected.

One sombre thought prevailed: Had the two capital ships now become enmeshed in a tactical situation from which there might be no escape?

At 1230 on 8 December, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet, held a crucial meeting aboard flagship Prince of Wales attended by the battleship's commanding officer, Captain John Leach, the commanding officer of Repulse, Captain Tennant, his Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral Pallister, and a number of other senior officers. The C-in-C took the chair and concisely outlined the military situation which had already begun to take on a grim aspect: successful enemy beachheads had been established at four points on the Kra Isthmus and the Malay coast; the Army was falling back; the RAF and RAAF had suffered crippling losses; and a powerful Japanese naval force of at least two battleships and a number of heavy cruisers was patrolling in the South China Sea.

Phillips detailed his plan for immediate action. The two capital ships would sortie from Singapore with a screen of four destroyers (two of whom, HMS Tenedos and HMAS Vampire, dated from World War I) shortly before dusk that day in the hope of avoiding detection by submarines. The force would proceed to a point east of the Anambas Islands then turn north-northwest to a point about 150 miles south of Cape Cambodia (known locally as Cape Camo). The intention was then for the fleet to arrive off Singora at dawn on the 10th and to destroy the Japanese transports and their escorts off the beachhead. The fleet would then return at high speed to Singapore.

Phillips made it clear that the success of the venture depended upon a number of provisions: air reconnaissance northward of the force; fighter coverage over the Singora beachhead; speed of execution; and the element of surprise.

Phillips made a personal request to the RAF C-in-C, Air Marshal Pulford, for the Air Force cooperation he needed; Pulford replied candidly that he could possibly provide the reconnaissance ahead of the force as it headed northward, but he could not promise the fighter protection over Singora nearly 2 days hence.

At 1735 that evening, the diminutive Admiral Phillips took Force "Z" down the Johore Strait on its one and only mission. Only an hour before sailing Pulford had received a signal from the commanding officer at Kota Bharu warning that the airfield there was untenable, and the implication was clear: there would be no fighter protection over the force as it neared Singora. Phillips, however, was not to get this information until seven hours after sailing.

During the afternoon news had been received of the devastating attack on Pearl Harbour, and there were few illusions among the more senior officers in Force "Z" about the efficiency of the Japanese naval pilots. Their one faint hope lay in the fact that no Japanese aircraft carrier had been reported with the force in the South China Sea.

As Force "Z" headed out into that sea the weather worsened and brought hope of cloud and rain to provide concealment from enemy aircraft and submarines. Then, at 2253, Phillips received the fateful signal from Pulford: "Fighter protection on Wednesday 10th will not, repeat not, be possible."

The situation was now deteriorating so rapidly that Phillips could hardly have been criticized had he decided to abandon the operation. As well as there being no air cover, he also learnt that reconnaissance would be provided by a solitary Catalina. Phillips could only pray that his force would steam unobserved throughout its foray north. His signal to his force effectively concealed the anxiety he must have been feeling:

"The enemy has made several landings on the north coast of Malaya and has made local progress. Our Army is not large and is hard pressed in some places. Our Air Force has had to destroy and abandon one or more aerodromes. Meanwhile fast transports lie off the coast.
"This is our opportunity before the enemy can establish itself. We have made a wide circuit to avoid air reconnaissance and hope to surprise the enemy shortly after sunrise tomorrow, Wednesday. We may have the luck to try our metal against the old Japanese battlecruiser Kongo or against some Japanese cruisers and destroyers which are reported in the Gulf of Siam. We are sure to get some useful practice with the HA armament.

"Whatever we meet I want to finish quickly and so get well clear to the eastward before the Japanese can mass too formidable a scale of air attack against us. So shoot to sink."

Prince of Wales steamed four cables (800 yards) ahead of Repulse, with the destroyers Electra and Express screening ahead and Tenedos and Vampire on either beam. The two capital ships looked business-like and majestic, with their high-angle guns pointing purposefully skyward in anticipation of attack. Rain, mist and low clouds effectively concealed the force during the long hours of the 9th until just before sunset.

Around midnight on 8th/9th December, Rear-Admiral Hashimoto had assembled his destroyers of the 3rd Flotilla off Kota Bharu and headed for a rendezvous with Vice-Admiral Ozawa's five heavy cruisers; all ships of the Malaya Force would then return to Camranh Bay to prepare for further operations. The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Force, Vice-Admiral Kondo, having received a false report that Prince of Wales and Repulse were still in Singapore, was also heading for Camranh Bay with his two battleships, two heavy cruisers and screening destroyers.

In the evening of 9 December Admiral Phillips made a decision of profound importance requiring great moral courage: he determined to call off the operation and return to Singapore.

This decision was based on the fact that around sunset, as the weather began to clear, a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft had been sighted. Obviously the element of surprise was now lost, and without fighter protection and with only a sole Catalina to provide aerial reconnaissance his mission stood virtually no chance of success. While he still retained the belief that capital ships on the open sea, with plenty of room to manoeuvre, could survive even the most intense air attack the Japanese could launch, his main worry was that a crippling injury to one of his ships would impede the speed of withdrawal from the battle area and lay the force open to possible attack by Japanese surface forces.

At 1845 he detached the old destroyer Tenedos with instructions to radio Singapore when well clear of the force to send all available destroyers to meet Force "Z" as it sped down the Malayan east coast. In hope of confusing the enemy Phillips intended to temporarily proceed with the original plan - to head north until after sunset, then turn towards the coast at 26 knots for a short period before turning south. That final turn, towards base, was made at 2000.

What Phillips did not know, however, was that apart from the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft his presence had also been reported by an unseen enemy - the Japanese submarine I-65.

This submarine had spotted Force "Z" at 1315 on 9 December, south of Pilau Condore, and as soon as it was safe had surfaced and sent off a sighting report. This report reached the 22nd Naval Air Flotilla at Saigon at 1540, much to the consternation of Rear-Admiral Matsunaga who had just received a report from one of his own reconnaissance planes that the two capital ships were still at Singapore. Confirmation of the error of the plane's report spurred Matsunaga to launch an immediate attack against the British ships, but the aircraft failed to find their target in the gathering darkness.

The omission of a carrier from the powerful naval forces deployed to the South China Sea for operations against Malaya and the Philippines was a deliberate move - and a calculated risk - by Admiral Yamamoto, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. The attack on Pearl Harbour required all 6 fleet carriers to ensure success, and the only other fully operational carrier, light carrier Ryujo, had been assigned to operations against the southern Philippines, operating out of Palau. Yamamoto had full confidence in the ability of the highly trained 22nd Air Flotilla, which had already proven its combat efficiency and gained valuable experience in China., to counter British capital ships.

Vice-Admiral Ozawa, the commander of the Malaya Force, did not, however, share Yamamoto's confidence that land-based aircraft alone could sink such powerful ships as Prince of Wales and Repulse, so that when he received the report from I-65 that the two big ships were at sea he planned to engage them in night action, using the torpedoes of his cruisers and destroyers, and then finish them off in daylight. Vice-Admiral Kondo, upon receiving the same disturbing news, headed for a point east of Pulau Condore which he established as a rendezvous for all units of the Southern Force - which included Ozawa's Malaya Force.
Like Ozawa, Kondo was also sceptical about the ability of land-based air power to deal with a battleship force. His intention was to use the aircraft of the 22nd Air Flotilla to damage and hopefully slow the British ships, and then engage them in a decisive battle - using chiefly torpedoes, and desirably, by night, utilising all the available strength of his assigned forces.

Upon further consideration, however, Kondo decided against a night action. The destroyers of the 3rd Flotilla needed to refuel, and were in fact well on their way to Camranh Bay when they received Ozawa's order to join up with the four heavy cruisers of Rear-Admiral Kurita's 7th Squadron. Further, the 3rd Flotilla had been assigned from First Fleet; Kondo's and Kurita's cruisers were Second Fleet ships. The Malaya Force was a makeshift one, and had no previous training together for a co-ordinated night action.

Added to this was Kondo's doubt that he would be able to concentrate his forces before daylight on the 10th; if the enemy ships continued on their reported northward course, there was a danger that they might pick off the Japanese warships piecemeal as they headed in separate groups for Kondo's rendezvous point.

Accordingly, the Southern Force commander aimed to seek an engagement after daylight on 10 December, with his entire fleet to assemble in a position about 40 miles east of Pulau Condore. Ozawa was told at 1630 on the 9th to attempt to draw the enemy northward by making free use of his radios; at the time he received this instruction he was heading south at high speed in heavy cruiser Chokai with Kurita's four heavy cruisers to seek out the British force.

Reports that reached Kondo, Ozawa and Matsunaga during the night concerning the position, course and speed of the enemy battleships were both inaccurate and confusing. Widely varying position reports did nothing to help the admirals in arranging their forces and planning their actions, and Ozawa in particular was deeply concerned about the possibility of Japanese ships engaging each other in the darkness.

It was about 1800 on the 9th when Ozawa received Kondo's order to rendezvous, and at the same time he received a sighting report of the two battleships from a floatplane launched from the light cruiser Kinu, one of the two submarine flotilla flagships operating in the South China Sea. (This was the aircraft spotted by Force "Z" around sunset.)

A third report, from a floatplane launched by the heavy cruiser Suzuya of Kurita's squadron and timed at 1810, enabled Ozawa and his staff to determine that the British force was about 70 miles from him on a bearing of 170 degrees.

By that time, however, visibility was poor, and Ozawa's group - heavy cruiser Chokai and destroyer Sagiri - and Kurita's group - 7th Squadron and the 3rd Flotilla - had lost sight of each other and were maintaining contact by radio-telephone. Moreover, the light cruisers Kinu and Yura had not yet joined either group, and their positions were not accurately known.

Despite Kondo's order to come north, Ozawa altered course to 200 degrees at 1820 in order to approach the enemy force, and Kurita followed suit. If visual contact were made, the Japanese would use their speed advantage to reverse course and draw the enemy towards Kondo, remaining out of range of the guns of the British capital ships.

At 1846 a report was received from heavy cruiser Kumano's floatplane:

"Two enemy battleships of Renown-class sighted. Position, 70 miles on a bearing of 185 degrees from my point of departure. Course, 50 degrees, speed 16 knots."

The report was timed 1820; the same aircraft reported directly afterwards that the enemy battleships had a screen of five destroyers.

When this position was plotted in Ozawa's flagship, it seemed that less than 50 miles separated the two forces at 1830. But the enemy's course was not what Ozawa and his staff had expected: they had assumed that the British intended to attack the Japanese forces in the Singora area, and the Malaya Force's course of south-southwest had been intended to get in a position ahead of the enemy fleet. Now it was evident that if both forces maintained their respective headings the distance between them would increase.

Accordingly, Ozawa altered course to 165 degrees at 1850 and then to 130 degrees ten minutes later, Kurita conforming, and reduced speed to 21 knots.

It was now an hour after sunset, and the steadily-worsening visibility was down to little more than 2 nautical miles. In view of this, Ozawa reduced speed further to 16 knots at 1910, ordering Kurita to do likewise. There was no expectation that the visibility would improve until at least the time of moonrise - 2238.

Ozawa and Kurita were still not in visual contact; Kinu had joined Ozawa at 1907, but Yura as yet had not, and in fact did not join at all during the night.

By 1930 all the Malaya Force ships were heading 050 degrees, parallel to the reported course of the enemy, and at this time Ozawa's staff estimated the British ships to bear 110-120 degrees, distant 35 to 40 miles.

Force "Z", however, had altered course to 280 degrees at 1855, and at 1925 had passed about 18 miles astern of Ozawa and 22 miles south of Kurita. Had Admiral Phillips maintained his northerly course for another 15 minutes, it is almost certain that he would have made contact with the Japanese.

There might have then been another Matapan, especially if the British had made the first sighting. Phillips, however, was no Admiral Cunningham, and although the 7th Squadron cruisers and the 3rd Flotilla destroyers had not worked together previously, they were still highly trained in night combat and were therefore highly unlikely to make the same mistakes the Italians had made in the Mediterranean.

After the two forces passed each other, with the British heading west and the Japanese northeast, the distance between them rapidly increased. At 2230 Ozawa gave up any hope of making contact with the enemy during darkness, and altered to a heading of 020 degrees towards the rendezvous with Kondo.

The Southern Force commander reached the rendezvous point at 2330, and then headed south to meet the Malaya Force. All three groups - Kondo's, Ozawa's and Kurita's - had joined up by 0230 on the 10th, whereupon Kondo led the entire force southward at 24 knots.
And an impressive force it was. Admiral Phillips' ships might have outgunned their Japanese counterparts, but the total Japanese force now amounted to two fast battleships, seven heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and no fewer than 21 destroyers.

But the gun and torpedo duel never eventuated. During the night of 9th/10th December and during the morning of the 10th the Japanese lost, found, again lost and then for the last fatal time found Phillips' ships.

Submarine I-58 made a sighting report that was received by Kondo at 0311 on the 10th; this put the enemy 200 miles distant on a bearing of 240 degrees, apparently heading back to Singapore. Chances of interception now seemed slim, but Kondo continued southward, at the same time ordering his land-based air forces and submarine forces to "žmake every effort to intercept and destroy the enemy."

At 0614 the Southern Force built up speed to 28 knots, but half an hour later Kondo accepted the inevitable and gave up the chase. At 0645 he reversed course for Camranh Bay, leaving th stage to the aircraft of the 22nd Air Flotilla.

Shortly after midnight on 9th/10th December Phillips had received a signal from Singapore: "Enemy reported landing at Kuantan, latitude 03 degrees 50 north."

Phillips studied the situation closely and thought that at last events seemed to be taking a turn in his favour. A landing at Kuantan would be a tactical move of vital importance to the Japanese, cutting off British forces to the north and placing Japanese troops within 150 miles of Singapore. Phillips also saw that his force was ideally positioned to make an effective move against such an amphibious landing, and decided upon a bold move: to turn towards Kuantan, arrive at dawn, crush the attempted landing then resume his southerly course for Singapore.

It was nearly 0100 when course was altered towards Kuantan, and only an hour later than I-58 spotted the force on its new course.

Shortly after 0600 the aircraft of the 22nd Air Flotilla began taking off for an armed reconnaissance sortie. Firstly twelve aircraft, of which 9 were bombers, set off to locate the British force, then between 0730 and 0930 that morning 34 G3M "Nell" twin-engined aircraft loaded with bombs, another 26 carrying torpedoes, and 26 G4M "Betty" attack aircraft also armed with torpedoes took off from their airfields near Saigon to scour the waters between the Anambas Islands and the Malayan coast.

By 1105, however, these aircraft were heading back to base, having found nothing, when a Ki-15 "Babs" reconnaissance aircraft reported:
"Sighted two enemy battleships seventy miles southeast Kuantan course southeast."
With no regard for their low fuel states, all the homeward-bound aircraft immediately turned towards the reported position.

Meanwhile, the British force had completed its investigation of the so-called landings at Kuantan. Force "Z" arrived off the town about 0800 to find no evidence whatsovere of Japanese activity. Phillips sent destroyer Express into the harbour to assess the situation more accurately, but the Aldis lamp signal to the flagship reported: "All's as quiet as a wet Sunday afternoon."
The reported landings were obviously based upon false information, and it is ironic that Phillips should have made his fateful decision to change his plans on the strength of what turned out to be an unfounded rumour.

The Admiral proposed searching the area in the anticipation of locating an invasion force heading for Kuantan as such a landing still seemed logical and, militarily, a sound proposition, but soon discarded this choice of action in favour of a continued high-speed return to Singapore.
Prince of Wales led Repulse in quarter-line formation with one destroyer ahead and one on either beam. The ships steamed along through a calm sea under an almost cloudless sky at a speed of 25 knots.

It was at 1113, just 8 minutes after the sighting by the reconnaissance aircraft, that 9 twin-engined bombers were spotted off the starboard bow of Force "Z". Prince of Wales opened up with her 5.25-inch guns, and the battle began.

The Japanese aircraft chose Repulse as the target for their first attack. The 9 aircraft flew in a tight formation, apparently undeterred by the anti-aircraft barrage from the entire force, and released their 250kg bombs from 10,000 feet. Eight were near-misses, while the ninth scored a direct hit amidships, exploding in the Marines' mess but failing to impair the ship's fighting ability. She steamed on at 25 knots.

At 1130 a group of 16 or 17 torpedo bombers came on the scene, crossed ahead of the force from starboard to port then began their attack from that side. They approached in seemingly scattered groups, and the ships immediately put up a barrage of fire which to the British sailors seemed as impenetrable as a steel curtain. Yet the aircraft flew right through the barrage and launched the first torpedo attack. It proved fatal, and in one devastating blow disproved all Phillips' long-held contentions about the vulnerability of aircraft to the well-controlled fire-power of capital ships.

Both the big ships executed turns to comb the tracks of the torpedoes which were released from an altitude of about 500 feet. Captain Tennant in Repulse watched a dozen or so torpedoes pass harmlessly by his ship, but was dismayed to see the flagship just over a mile away turn too late. A huge column of water erupted from Prince of Wales' stern and almost immediately the flagship took on a list to port of 13 degrees and her speed fell of to 15 knots. In this one moment of destiny the flagship's most vulnerable spot - her stern - had been struck by two torpedoes which had shattered the rudder, jammed the two port propeller shafts, and tore a large hole in the hull. The resulting flooding caused vital generators to fail, cutting power to her secondary armament.
In one dramatic moment the proud flagship had been reduced from a fully operational fighting ship to a vessel compelled to hoist the two black balls to indicate "My vessel is not under command."

The Japanese aircraft were now beginning to approach the scene of battle like vultures attracted to a corpse. A few minutes before noon a perfectly co-ordinated attack of medium-level bombing and another torpedo attack was carried out against Repulse, the Japanese pilots obviously deciding that the crippled Prince of Wales could be finished off at leisure later.

Captain Tennant, a veteran of the German bombing at Dunkirk, had never encountered bombing of such daring and accuracy to which his ship was now subjected. He handled his ship skilfully to successfully evade the bombs, all of which landed within 100 hundred yards of the battlecruiser. Almost simultaneously the second torpedo attack developed, and once again Tennant managed to con Repulse with fine judgement to comb the tracks.

In the ensuing brief lull, Tennant turned his attention to the flagship, altering course to close her and give whatever assistance he could. At 1220, when the two ships were less than half a mile apart, a third attack began to develop by 9 torpedo bombers approaching from the south. When about 3 miles away the formation divided, with 3 aircraft heading for Repulse and 6 for Prince of Wales.

Tennant watched the three torpedoes drop at 1221 and judged the moment to turn his ship to avoid them. As his ship turned, however, he was dismayed to see one of the six aircraft making its approach on the crippled flagship suddenly break away from its group, bank steeply and launch its torpedo at Repulse. Two more aircraft followed suit.

The battlecruiser was neatly trapped: Tennant knew that in order to evade the torpedoes launched by the first three aircraft he would be placing his ship in a position to be hit by one or more torpedoes launched by the other three - and vice-versa. He could only watch in horrified uncertainty and order, "Stand by for torpedo!"

One torpedo hit the battlecruiser amidships; she developed a slight list, but she was able to maintain 25 knots and her fighting ability was not impaired.

Almost immediately, however, another attack developed from three groups of aircraft who sped in to attack with devastating thoroughness from both sides. The ship's defences were overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers, and even as one bomber was sent crashing into the sea no less than 8 torpedoes from the first group were speeding towards Repulse.

All Tennant could do was manoeuvre his ship to avoid as many as he could. The first hit was on the port quarter and jammed the rudder; then two torpedoes struck the port side and one the starboard. Repulse took on a list to port as flooding spread between decks below the waterline, and her speed dropped to 15 knots. Tennant knew his ship and her inability to absorb such punishment, and promptly gave the order to prepare to abandon ship.

Unable to steer and with her speed cut almost in half Repulse was a virtual sitting duck for the next two attacks. Another 9 torpedoes struck the battlecruiser, making 14 all told, and she quickly began to settle. Just after 1230 she sank, thereby achieving the dubious distinction of being the first capital ship to be sunk by air attack in the open sea.

Of the three torpedoes launched at Prince of Wales at 1221 all hit on the starboard side - forward, amidships and aft. They had the strange effect of righting the ship's list to port, but this was a deceptive effect for the battleship was critically damaged. Her speed was reduced to 8 knots and she was unable to steer a straight course.

Then another medium-level bombing attack was made by 9 aircraft which crossed the ship from port to starboard. Only 6 of her sixteen 5.25-inch guns opened up against the attackers, and their uncontrolled fire was desultory and ineffectual. All the bombs fell close alongside except for one, which struck amidships on the port side.

Captain Leach was still, even at this stage, hoping to save his ship. Repulse had by now gone down, and a few minutes after 1300 Leach finally realised that his ship, too, was doomed. At 1305 he had Express come alongside to begin taking off wounded, then shortly after he gave the order to abandon ship.

Just before 1320 the flagship began her last ignominious roll over to port, and after completely capsizing she went to the bottom of the South China Sea.

The destroyers then went about their work of hauling survivors from the oil-covered waters, and the three ships were soon almost swamped by a sea of humanity. Even so, of a total of 2921 men in the two capital ships, 840 perished.

Admiral Phillips was never seen again; he went down with his flagship, as if in a gesture of acceptance that bombers and torpedo aircraft were more than a match for a well-drilled capital ship bereft of air cover. Captain Leach was found floating face-down in the water an hour after his ship disappeared. Captain Tennant was picked up by HMAS Vampire.

The three destroyers reached Singapore naval base just before midnight.

Of the 84 aircraft which are recorded as having carried out the attacks on Force "Z", 3 were shot down, 1 crashed on landing, 2 were severely damaged and 25 slightly damaged.