After the passage of convoy PQ18 in September 1942, the operations of the Arctic convoys were reviewed. The Admiralty wished to sail one large convoy, with a large escort like PQ18, but there were insufficient escorts.
The C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey, pressed for two smaller convoys. He considered that the lack of daylight would put a stop to air reconnaissance, and that smaller, easier-handled convoys might evade both air and submarine attack. Small convoys were also easier to reform after bad weather.
The First Sea Lord insisted on two cruisers sailing all the way into the Barents Sea with the convoys, which Tovey later agreed was a wise move.
As with PQ18, Tovey remained at Scapa Flow in King George V to control operations.
Convoy JW51A was the first eastbound convoy; it left Loch Ewe on 15 December and arrived at Murmansk 10 days later without being attacked.
In those latitudes in December, the sun does not rise more than 6 degrees above the horizon; there were about 2½ hours in the middle of the day when there was sufficient light for the enemy to find and attack the convoy, and to be able to distinguish ships at distances up to 10 miles.
Captain Sherbrooke, leading the 17th Destroyer Flotilla, was the escort commander for convoy JW51B. He assessed the greatest threat as being German surface ships, as the limited period of daylight would make submarine and air attack unlikely.
Sherbrooke assumed that a surface attack would come from only one direction at a time, and issued orders that at the first sign of attack:
1. His 5 destroyers (Onslow, Obedient, Obdurate, Oribi and Orwell) would, without orders, leave their stations around the convoy and join on the threatened side in line ahead;
2. The convoy would turn away from the direction of the threat, the rear merchantmen dropping smoke floats;
3. The old destroyers Achates and Bulldog would lay a smokescreen between the convoy and the enemy and remain between Sherbrooke's destroyers and the convoy;
4. The remaining escorts (sloops, corvettes and trawlers) would screen the convoy.
Rear-Admiral Burnett commanded Force "R", the cruiser covering force, comprising the light cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica and the destroyers Matchless and Musketeer. Burnett intended to cover the convoy from about 40 miles astern. This force sailed from Murmansk on 27 December, but owing to the convoy's reported position at 1600 on 29 December being 150 miles in error to the east, Burnett in fact passed ahead of the convoy instead of astern of it.
Admiral Klüber was the German Flag Officer, Northern Waters, and flew his flag in the light cruiser Köln in Altenfjord. He gave the following orders to Vice-Admiral Kummetz (Flag Officer, Cruisers), Captain Hartman (Commanding Officer, heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper) and Captain Strange of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla for Operation "Regenboden" ("Rainbow"):
"The task is to destroy PQ20 (as OKM identified JW51B). According to the existing report of U-354 the convoy is not strongly escorted… It is suspected that the two British cruisers and escorts that left Kola Inlet on 27the December are with the convoy, and it is expected that there are three or four enemy submarines at sea.
"Procedure on meeting the enemy: avoid a superior force, otherwise destroy according to the tactical situation."
There was a separate plan, Operation "Aurora", which was an independent shakedown cruise for the heavy cruiser (former "pocket-battleship) Lützow after the attack on the convoy.
Kummetz formed his forces into two attack groups: Hipper with destroyers Friedrich Eckholdt, Richard Beitzen and Z-29; Lützow with destroyers Theodor Riedel, Z-30 and Z-31. He decided to attack during the 2½ hours of near-daylight, from the port and starboard quarters of the convoy - i.e., from the west.
JW51B, of 14 ships, sailed from Loch Ewe on 22 December 1942; destroyer Bulldog, which had suffered damage in a gale, did not join the escort.
Battleship Anson, heavy cruiser Cumberland and 3 destroyers reached their covering position south of the convoy on 27th, and patrolled against attack from the south until the 29th.
Admiral Burnett's Force "R" sailed from Murmansk on the 27th.
Destroyer Oribi lost touch with the convoy on the 28th after a gyro-compass failure.
The convoy ran into a gale on 28-29 December; when it passed, 5 merchantmen were missing. The minesweeper Bramble was detached at 1230 on the 29th to search for the ships north of the convoy.
Burnett detached his two destroyers to Scapa Flow at 0800 on the 29th.
Four of the "lost" ships rejoined the convoy on the 30th.
U-354 sighted the convoy at 1240 on the 30th, south of Bear Island, and reported 6 to 10 ships with an escort of possible one cruiser and several destroyers. Hipper, Lützow and the 6 destroyers were put on 3 hours' notice for steam for both Operations "Regenboden" and "Aurora".
The German ships sailed from Altenfjord at 1740 on 30 December. At 1840 Kummetz received another order:
"Contrary to the operational order regarding contact against the enemy, (you are to) use caution even against enemy of equal strength because it is undesirable for the cruisers to take any great risks".
U-354 was spotted on the surface at 2015 on the 30th, forced to dive, depth-charged and forced to break contact. At midnight she was ordered to report the convoy's position to Kummetz every 2 hours.
At 0830 on the 31st the weather was clear, with visibility about 7 miles to the north and 10 miles to the south, except when snow squalls occurred and visibility shut down to about 1 or 2 miles, maximum. Visibility would also be poor if a ship was sighted against a background of low cloud or snow squalls. It was difficult to distinguish friend from foe in the twilight before about 1100 and after 1330. The minesweeper Bramble, trawler Northern Gem, SS Chester Valley and one straggler were still not with the convoy, but sailing to the north.
The drama began to unfold at 0830 on the morning of 31 December. The corvette Hyderabad was on the starboard quarter of the convoy when her captain spotted two shapes on the horizon that could only be destroyers. He had been advised that two Russian destroyers were moving west to assist in the escort, so he took no action. The same ships were sighted by Obdurate ten minutes later, but this time her captain advised Sherbrooke "Two unidentified destroyers bearing west, course north". Sherbrooke signalled "Investigate", but lamp signalling takes time and Obdurate's captain had anticipated the order and was already swinging around.
By 0915, Obdurate had sighted three destroyers and flashed a challenge. There was no reply, which might not have been suspicious if they had been Russian, but suddenly one of the German ships opened fire. The British ships immediately began to go into a formation previously ordered by Sherbrooke. Onslow, Obdurate, Obedient and Orwell steamed in the direction of the gun flashes, while Achates, which was between the convoy and the enemy began a smokescreen of black smoke from her funnels and white smoke from smoke floats.
A half hour later, Sherbrooke made out a large ominous-looking shape in the haze and it was heading straight for him. Finally, it made a turn to port which enabled him to identify it. There could be no doubt. It was Hipper, a hulk about seven times the size of his flagship. Courageous as his four 1,540-ton destroyers might have been, they were no match for her eight 8-inch guns.
At 0930, Admiral Burnett's two cruisers began making flank speed to join the fray. Meanwhile, Hipper brought all guns to bear on Achates, which made a perfect target because it stood out in contrast to its own black smokescreen. It took crippling damage with the loss of 40 men plus her captain, Lt-Cdr A.H.T. Jones, but then Hipper shifted its guns to Onslow and Orwell.
Both ships were now darting in and out of the snow squalls and smoke. The dazzle camouflage patterns of British ships sometimes made them easier to spot but in this circumstance it worked to their distinct advantage. Gunners aboard Hipper had difficulty in finding targets in the dappled grey haze and the superiority of British fire-control radar was now making a difference. Meanwhile, the plucky Achates continued to protect the convoy with her smokescreen. Finally, at 1254 a trawler came alongside to take off the surviving 80 crewmembers. At 1314 the brave little ship capsized and sank.
It was beginning to appear to Sherbrooke that the Germans had no great lust for battle. Instead of steaming toward the targets, bringing all forward guns to bear and presenting a smaller silhouette, Kummetz seemed to retreat and hide in the smoke and squalls while inching his way to the northeast. His log entry on the occasion tells the story: "Only quick action can solve the problem of danger from torpedo attacks and this has to be considered in the light of my orders not to take any serious risks."
Nevertheless, his evasive actions had the effect of causing the British to react as the German Naval Staff had predicted. The convoy was now turning away to the southeast behind a smokescreen right where Kummetz knew Lützow would be waiting to spring the trap. Sherbrooke decided to shadow the Hipper with his own ship plus the Orwell, maintaining the threat of the torpedo fire that was Kummetz's only fear from two British destroyers. The rest of his flotilla was dispatched to guard the convoy. He knew that as long as he could keep Hipper preoccupied, it would be unable to break through to endanger the convoy.
Hipper and Sherbrooke's destroyers exchanged inaccurate gunfire made difficult by the poor visibility, frozen ammunition racks and the constant icing-up of gun barrels. Finally, Hipper turned northward in an attempt to draw the British destroyers after him. When this failed, he turned back and with clearing weather conditions was able to score some solid hits on Onslow. One hit shattered a surface radar antenna and caused thousands of splinters to pepper the bridge. One struck Sherbrooke in the head, smashing a cheekbone and causing his left eye to hang loose from its socket. For a few moments no one on the bridge knew of his injury because he kept giving orders in an even voice. Another officer nearby found himself covered in blood and thought he had been hit, but soon noticed that it was Sherbrooke who had been severely wounded. In the finest British "stiff upper lip" tradition, Sherbrooke refused medical attention until finally command of the flotilla was passed to Lt-Cdr D. C. Kinloch in Obedient. Forty-seven men had been killed or wounded on the Onslow and for his valour, Sherbrooke was later awarded the Victoria Cross. In Hipper, Kummetz was unaware of having dealt the crippling blow as he turned his attention to Obedient, which had impudently opened fire first. A short but inconclusive exchange ensued, during which Kummetz apparently recalled his orders to avoid unnecessary risks.
While this was a case of a heavy cruiser pitted against a destroyer, he had to be well aware that the destroyer had eight unexpended torpedoes, while his ship was inadequately armoured. Also, British 8-inch shells consistently detonated while German shells were notoriously unreliable.
To compound Kummetz's dilemma, Admiral Burnett's cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica appeared seemingly out of nowhere. Sheffield opened fire first, straddling Hipper with several salvos before getting her range and then scoring a damaging hit. Kummetz attempted to swing around and make smoke but before he could do so Hipper took two more hits.
Again immobilized by Hitler's restrictive orders, he decided he was already in deep trouble for taking what the Führer would consider an unacceptable risk, so he ordered a cease-fire and a speedy withdrawal of all units.
Burnett, however, suffered no such reluctance to engage. At 1133, the German destroyers Friedrich Eckholdt and Richard Beitzen mistook Sheffield and Jamaica for Hipper and Lützow and attempted to link up with them. Before the German commanders could realize their error, every gun on the two British cruisers opened up.
Being closer in, the Friedrich Eckholdt was hit directly amidships and sunk within less than two minutes. Richard Beitzen escaped unharmed. This distraction had taken the British cruisers to the north of the convoy and caused them to lose contact with Hipper, which was now hustling westward to join the Lützow. Meanwhile, Captain Stänge aboard Lützow identified several possible targets in the convoy through the mist and smoke. The nearest was 3 miles away and the farthest 7. Though the range of his guns was 15 miles he fired 87 11-inch and 75 5.9-inch rounds without scoring a direct hit. Stänge had missed the sort of opportunity seldom presented to a naval commander.
Ironically, Admiral Kummetz's Operation Rainbow tactic had worked. The Hipper had served as a decoy to attract the escorts and the convoy had then turned southward directly into the path of the pocket battleship Lutzow, just as expected. But both German heavyweights were timidly fought, although it must be admitted that they had been hampered by periods of poor visibility. As he retreated toward the naval base at Altenfjord, Stänge noted sadly in his war diary, "As we withdrew from the battle scene, it was hard to escape the feeling that, even though the situation appeared to be in our favour, we were unable to get at the convoy and scored no successes whatsoever."
Convoy JW51B arrived intact in Kola Inlet on 3 January 1943.