The Second Battle of Guadalcanal
In a fierce, confused engagement that lasted barely 15 minutes in the early hours of Friday 13 November, Vice Admiral Abe Hiroaki's Advance Force Raiding Group had been prevented from carrying out a bombardment of the American airfield on Guadalcanal by the cruisers and destroyers of Rear-Admiral Callaghan's Task Group 67.4.
Barely 24 hours later, Rear-Admiral Nishimura's heavy cruisers Suzuya and Maya had been able to approach the island opposed by nothing more than PT-boats, and had bombarded Henderson Field with 989 rounds from their 8-inch guns from 0128 to 0205. The airfield had not been "neutralised", however, and its aircraft joined with those from the carrier Enterprise to attack Nishimura's cruisers and Vice-Admiral Mikawa's covering force as the two groups headed back to the Shortland Islands. Heavy cruiser Kinugasa had been sunk, and Maya, light cruiser Tenryu and destroyer Michishio had been damaged.
The Second Fleet commander, Vice-Admiral Kondo Nobutake, was now determined to put Henderson Field and its aircraft out of business once and for all.
During the forenoon of 14 November, he headed south from Ontong Java in his flagship, heavy cruiser Atago, with her sister-ship Takao, light cruiser Sendai, and destroyers Hatsuyuki and Shirayuki of the 11th Destroyer Group and Ayanami, Shikinami and Uranami of the 19th Destroyer Group. During the afternoon he was joined by the undamaged ships from Abe's force - battleship Kirishima, light cruiser Nagara, and destroyers Asagumo, Harusame, Inazuma, Murasame, Samidare and Teruzuki.
These ships he formed into three groups: the Bombardment Unit of Kirishima, Atago, Takao and 4 destroyers, the Patrol Unit of Nagara and 4 destroyers, and the Sweeping Unit of Sendai and 3 destroyers. His plan was the same as Abe's: to transit Indispensable Strait, pass west and south of Savo Island, and commence his bombardment from a position off Lunga Point around midnight on 14/15 November. He anticipated no serious surface opposition from the Americans, but nevertheless intended to "sanitize" the area using the light cruisers and destroyers before Kirishima and the heavy cruisers entered the restricted and dangerous waters off Lunga Point.
Kondo's caution was well founded, as there was indeed some "serious surface opposition" approaching Guadalcanal from the south.
Rear-Aadmiral Willis A. Lee's Battleship Division 6, comprising the new fast battleships Washington and South Dakota, had sailed from Noumea on 11 November as part of Vice-Admiral Kinkaid's Task Force 16, centred on Enterprise. After the furious battle in the early hours of the 13th, Task Force 64 had been formed on the orders of Admiral Halsey to proceed ahead of the carrier at best speed to the waters off Guadalcanal, and there to interdict any surface operation by the Japanese.
The new task force was commanded by Lee, and the only ships that could be spared from Enterprise's screen to escort his two battleships were the destroyers Benham, Gwin, Preston and Walke.
That the only two operational American battleships in the South Pacific were being risked against possible superior forces reflected Halsey's "all or nothing" attitude regarding Guadalcanal. At the same time, both Halsey and Lee recognized the limitations the latter would be under: the two battleships had not operated together previously, nor had any of the destroyers, all of whom were from different squadrons. Further, none of the destroyers was fitted with a modern SG surface-search radar, and only two had fire-control radar. It was another "scratch" force, but it was the best available following the losses suffered by Callaghan's task group.
Further, Naval War College doctrine forbade the use of battleships in a tightly confined space such as Ironbottom Sound, but Halsey knew that wars were won at sea, not in a textbook. He ordered the dreadnoughts committed.
At dusk on the 14th, as Task Force 64 approached the western end of Guadalcanal, Washington's Captain Davis told his crew: "We are going into an action area. We have no great certainty what forces we will encounter. We might be ambushed. A disaster of some sort may come upon us. But whatever it is we are going into, I hope to bring all of you back alive. Good luck to all of us."
At least Lee knew of Kondo's approach, as he had been detected and reported by the submarine Trout during the evening of the 14th, passing east of Santa Ysabel.
Task Force 64 left Cape Esperance abeam to starboard at 2030, heading north-northeast to pass up the western side of Savo Island. At 2110 Lee ordered course altered to due east, to pass some 10 miles north of Savo, across the northern entrance to Ironbottom Sound. If nothing were found on that leg, the task force would head southeast and then west, completing a circumnavigation of Savo, and then repeat the evolution if necessary.
Once again the American ships were in column, with Walke leading Benham, Preston, Gwin, Washington and South Dakota. Walke was 5000 yards ahead of the flagship; the destroyers were 500 yards apart, with South Dakota 1000 yards astern of Washington.
Kondo's force swept in from the north in two groups. Atago led Takao and Kirishima, with Rear-Admiral Kimura's flagship Nagara and destroyers Asagumo, Hatsuyuki, Inazuma, Samidare, Shirayuki and Teruzuki forming a close screen. Some 10 miles on the flagship's port bow was Rear-Aadmiral Hashimoto's Sweeping Unit, comprising Sendai, Ayanami, Shikinami and Uranami.
The course of the main body was southwest, which would take it to the west of Savo, from where the ships would turn and run in towards Lunga Point. Hashimoto's unit was to sweep the waters east of Savo, and give warning of any American ships that might be in the same area in which Abe encountered Callaghan nearly 48 hours earlier. This was a wise precaution on Kondo's part - and it paid dividends.
Lee reached the end of his easterly leg, about 8 miles due north of Savo, shortly before 2200, and altered to a course of 150 degrees. Whether it was the proximity of land affecting the radar picture, or a lack of alertness on the part of the operators, the Americans failed to detect Sendai and her destroyers, who at 2200 were only 8 miles on the port beam of Washington. Similarly, on that dark and cloudy night, Japanese lookouts were below their usual standard, and did not sight the American ships until they were only 6 miles distant.
At 2210, Hashimoto reported to Kondo, "Two enemy cruisers and four destroyers north of Savo." Shortly after, Hashimoto detached Ayanami and Uranami to proceed around the western side of Savo and head off the enemy force should it turn in that direction, while Sendai and Shikinami turned due south to follow the enemy ships at a safe distance. Lee maintained his course, unaware that he was being dogged by two Japanese ships on his port quarter.
Meanwhile, Kondo was pondering his next course of action. Should he race into battle with his bombardment force, or keep them in the rear while the destroyers and their torpedoes dealt with the enemy force?
He chose the latter, and at 2230 Nagara was detached with Hatsuyuki, Shirayuki, Inazuma and Samidare to proceed west of Savo and catch the enemy in a pincer movement with Hashimoto's group coming from the east. Neither Kondo nor Kimura, however, was aware that Hashimoto had already detached two destroyers to follow the same route, for the same purpose.
The Bombardment Unit maintained its southwesterly course, intending to keep its distance from the enemy force, and give battle only should the light cruisers and their destroyers get into trouble. Also, like Hiei and Kirishima two nights earlier, the three ships had their guns and shell-hoists loaded with bombardment shells, which would have to be replaced with armour-piercing shells before engaging surface ships.
Kondo was confident that his big ships would not be needed, however, as the two light cruisers and seven destroyers should be able to deal with "two cruisers and four destroyers" - although of the Japanese destroyers, only Samidare carried the Long Lance torpedo.
Sendai's misidentification of Washington and South Dakota is understandable. Only Japanese aircrew had so far seen the new American battleships, and as far as the men of the surface fleet knew, the enemy battle force was still lying at the bottom of Pearl Harbour. Hitherto, the largest American ships that the Japanese surface forces had encountered had been heavy cruisers; Sendai's lookouts could see four destroyers and two bigger ships, ergo they were cruisers.
At 2252 Lee gave the executive order for a wheel to the west, and Walke led the column around. Eight minutes later, as Washington completed her turn, she picked up a radar contact just under 10 miles to the north-northwest.
Lee held his fire while his flagship searched for more targets; he was sure they must be out there, as this first contact did not indicate the size of the force reported by Trout.
By 2317, however, no other radar contacts had been made, and both battleships had Sendai fixed in the optical sights of their main battery directors; Lee gave the order to open fire, with the range to Sendai a little over 6 miles.
Washington's first 16-inch salvo was a straddle, as was that of her 5-inch secondary battery. South Dakota's 16-inch shells landed all around Shikinami, and the Americans were sure they had hit and sunk her.
Hashimoto did not hesitate: he ordered his flagship's skipper to open the range - fast! Sendai heeled over in a hard port turn as the engineers spun their throttle wheels to bring the cruiser up to full speed; Washington's second salvo landed exactly where Sendai would have been had she maintained her southerly course.
As soon as she saw her flagship put her whell hard over, Shikinami did likewise, turning inside the cruiser just as South Dakota's second salvo of seven shells flung huge columns of dirty water upwards only 100 metres off her starboard bow.
The size of the shell splashes prompted Hashimoto to revise his contact report, and signalled Kondo that the two cruisers reported earlier were "possible battleships".
This report caused some consternation on Atago's flag bridge, as the presence of such ships in Guadalcanal waters was entirely unexpected that night. So far the Americans had kept their new battleships with their carriers, and Kondo knew that Enterprise was still well to the south of Guadalcanal. The enemy obviously had deduced that a Japanese bombardment mission was planned for that night, and had deployed their heaviest ships accordingly.
The presence of two "possible battleships" threw a whole new light on the situation. Light cruisers and destroyers could not be expected to deal with that weight of opposition, and if he were to carry out his bombardment Kondo would first have to remove the threat posed by the enemy capital ships.
And he was not all that confident that he could do so. Kirishima was armed with eight 14-inch guns, while intelligence had (correctly) reported that the new American battleships carried nine 16-inch guns. The twenty 8-inch guns of Atago and Takao would have to provide the equaliser, with the torpedoes of both the cruisers and the destroyers perhaps giving the Japanese a slight edge.
And perhaps, just perhaps, they were not new battleships, but older battleships of the "New Mexico" Class with 14-inch guns¼
At 2305 Kondo had altered course to due south, and at 2315 he turned northeast, marking time in the waters northwest of Savo while his light forces dealt with the "two cruisers and four destroyers" originally reported. Shortly after receiving Hashimoto's alarming amplifying report he turned the Bombardment Unit southeast, and five minutes later at 2330, the ships came around to the southwest. All the while the turret and magazine crews sweated and strained to replace the APHE shells with armour piercing - the second time the men of Kirishima had had to perform the evolution in less than 48 hours.
By 2330 the Second Battle of Guadalcanal was well under way, with Hashimoto's other two destroyers now in on the act.
Ayanami and Uranami were racing southward off the west coast of Savo at 2317 when the horizon to the southeast lit up with what looked like sheet lightning. Then the two ships picked up Hashimoto's alarming signal, and at 2320 they altered course towards what they now knew were gun flashes. Three minutes later, enemy destroyers were sighted almost dead ahead on a reciprocal course, distance about 12,000 metres (6½ miles); the fire-control systems acquired the targets within seconds of the sighting, and as the two destroyers steadied on a new heading of due east to open their firing arcs, their 5-inch guns spat their challenge.
The American destroyers, lacking surface-search radar, were forced to rely on visual detection, and on this night they proved for once to be the equal of the Japanese. Walke sighted two enemy destroyers about 6 miles off the starboard bow at 2322; Lee immediately ordered an alteration of course to 300 degrees, which was not a good tactical move as it masked the enemy ships ahead from the American destroyers' after guns.
Nevertheless, Walke opened fire as soon as her fire-control radar was locked on. Benham and Preston, who had no FC radar, were unable to acquire the targets visually, and Gwin, the designated illuminating ship, pumped out only two rounds of starshell before switching to HE.
Ayanami and Uranami skilfully used the backdrop of Savo Island to confuse the enemy's eyes, both human and electronic, while they pumped out salvo after salvo at the American destroyers. So well did the Japanese destroyers merge with the background that observers in the American ships thought that their gun flashes were from shore batteries on Savo.
The two Japanese destroyers concentrated mainly on Walke, and hit her repeatedly. Her captain tried to manoeuvre for a torpedo attack, but the incoming shells had damaged the ship's steering gear, and Walke began falling off to port.
Nagara and her four destroyers swept into Ironbottom Sound a little over 4 miles behind Ayanami and Uranami. The Americans were fully occupied with the pair of Japanese destroyers, and Kimura was able to get within 5 miles of the enemy destroyers without being seen. Nagara then brought Walke under very accurate and damaging fire, adding to that destroyer's woes.
The four destroyers astern of Kimura's flagship targeted Benham and Preston, and when Nagara observed Walke stagger drunkenly out of line to port she shifted her aim to Preston. The destroyer reeled under numerous hits, and a salvo from Nagara wrecked both her fire-rooms. Another hit blew away her after funnel, and the ship was soon a mass of flames from the bridge aft.
Five of Nagara's shells struck Preston simultaneously at 2335, tearing her thin hull open to the sea. Less than a minute after these hits, Preston's skipper ordered abandon ship; men were still going over the side when the destroyer rolled over to starboard and sank stern first. Her bow, held up by a pocket of air, remained pointing at the dark sky for about 10 minutes, then slipped from sight.
Ayanami and Uranami had done well, but they had not had it all their own way. The American flagship eventually ranged on them with her secondary batteries, and along Washington's starboard side the five twin 5-inch mounts began pouring out a steady stream of fire at the two elusive destroyers.
The radar-controlled guns soon began hitting, and fires broke out in both Japanese ships. At 2330 they launched a Parthian salvo of torpedoes, then turned away to the northeast.
Ayanami was worst hit, having taken more than twenty 5-inch shells above and below the waterline. She gradually slowed to a halt as her machinery spaces were flooded, and Uranami stood by, ready to take off her crew.
The torpedoes fired by the two ships had been meant for the American battleships, but all missed these two lucrative targets as they diverged from their steady course around 2334. One of the torpedoes found a target, however, in the wallowing Walke. The blast blew away the forward part of the ship as far back as the bridge, hurled No.2 5-inch mount a hundred feet into the air, buckled the forward bulkhead of No.1 fire-room and thus completely destroyed the ship's watertight integrity.
As the ship's forward momentum threatened to drive her under, her skipper ordered the engines astern, then passed the order to abandon ship. Shortly after, the weakened bulkhead of the forward fire-room gave way, and Walke began to settle. At 2342 she sank from sight.
Nagara and her four destroyers continued to pound the American destroyers until 2335, when they wheeled away to the west-northwest, each ship launching torpedoes as they turned.
Benham had attempted to follow Walke as that ship fell off to port, then realised that it was not a planned manoeuvre on the part of the ship ahead and turned further port to avoid her. As Walke slipped down her starboard side, Benham came back to her original course, her visually-controlled guns still seeking out a target to the north. Her torpedo tubes were trained out an ready, but her captain was after bigger targets than destroyers.
She never got a chance, however, as a torpedo launched by one of Kimura's ships struck her forward at 2338. The point of impact was slightly closer to the stem than in Walke, so Benham lost her forepart only as far back as the forward bulkhead of No.1 magazine.
The blast lifted the ship about 4 feet out of the water and rolled her well over to port; as she settled down again, she rolled back about 30 degrees to starboard, then came to rest on an even keel. The whipsawing effect of the explosion broke Benham's back, buckled plates and opened a crack in her main deck above the forward fire-room. The destroyer's speed dropped rapidly from 27 knots to about 5, and her skipper now forgot all about the battle while he tried to save his ship. With full left rudder, the port engine stopped and the starboard engine ahead at standard speed, Benham managed to complete a 180-degree turn and head back the way she had come.
After firing the initial two rounds of starshell, Gwin reloaded with HE and began pounding away at the two ships in the shadow of Savo - Ayanami and Uranami. She received much more than she gave, however, and shells from the Japanese destroyers struck her in the after engine-room and on the fantail. One hit tripped the safety links on her torpedoes, three of which slid harmlessly over the side while the other two stuck halfway out of their tubes.
Gwin lost track of Ayanami and Uranami as they turned away to the northeast, and then had to dodge the crippled Walke. She tried to acquire the second group of enemy ships, but before her fire-control radar could lock on Nagara and her destroyers had turned away. After that, Gwin found no more targets.
The Japanese light forces had sunk two of the American destroyers, crippled a third and damaged the fourth, at the cost of mortal damage to Ayanami. The first round, therefore, could be said to have gone to the Japanese; now the stage was taken over by the heavy units.
Washingto had been unable to acquire the Japanese destroyers with her main armament after the initial salvoes at Sendai and Shikinami, and had to be content with engaging Ayanami and Uranami with 5-inch batteries. This she did with devastating success, scoring more hits on the two enemy ships than all the American destroyers combined.
At 2334 Washington turned port to 280 degrees to avoid the stricken destroyers ahead of her, and at that stage her guns fell silent for want of targets. The American flagship thundered on through the night at 27 knots, her search- and fire-control radars scanning the waters ahead and to starboard for more of the enemy ships. Lee was certain that there bigger ships than destroyers lurking in the darkness west of Savo, and he was determined to find them.
South Dakota had dropped back to about 1500 yards astern of her consort, and kept up a steady rate of fire from her 16-inch cannons at the retreating Sendai and Shikinami for some fifteen minutes. Then, at 2333, her main circuit-breakers jumped out, cutting power throughout the ship. Such was the degree of reliance that the Americans placed in their radars that the battleship was temporarily rendered blind and helpless.
Power was restored after five minutes, just as South Dakota reached the point where Washington had put her wheel over in her turn to 280. South Dakota made to do the same, but then had to reverse her wheel to avoid the floundering Preston; thus the two American battleships separated, and lost visual contact with each other.
When clear of the crippled and sinking destroyers, South Dakota came back to 280, running parallel to Washington but almost 2 miles on her starboard quarter.
If Kondo had meant to confuse his enemy by dividing his forces, he certainly succeeded. Milling around at high speed in the narrow stretch of water between Savo and Guadalcanal at 2340 were three separate Japanese groups: Nagara had completed her turn to the west-northwest, with her four destroyers following dutifully astern; Ayanami and Uranami had managed to drag themselves from under the accurate 5-inch shellfire of Washington and the American destroyers, and Ayanami was lying dead in the water 2½ miles southeast of Savo; finally, Sendai and Shikinami had turned to close the enemy once again, and were 2 miles south of Savo and about to turn to parallel South Dakota, only about 5000 yards on the battleship's starboard beam.
It is little wonder that the American radar operators were experiencing great difficulty sorting out their pictures, with the echoes of 9 enemy ships and 5 friendly ships beginning to merge with side-echoes from Savo. The picture being presented to the command of both battleships was becoming increasingly confused, with reports of motor torpedo-boats, flares, lightning, phantom contacts and completely contradictory information compounding the confusion. Washington was holding and tracking numerous contacts to starboard, but she was not sure which one was South Dakota, and therefore held her fire. It was left to the Japanese to indicate to the American flagship where her consort was.
As South Dakota regained her electronic "eyes", her after main battery director visually locked on to a target almost dead astern. Only the after 16-inch turret could bear, and two 3-gun salvoes were sent roaring towards the target before she was recognized as Gwin.
Fortunately for the destroyer, the first salvo was short and the second over; the third would probably have blasted her out of the water, but her recognition lights were spotted by the battleship just in time. While South Dakota narrowly avoided inflicting serious damage on one of her own destroyers, however, she managed to inflict a momentarily serious wound on herself.
Firing almost dead astern, the muzzle blast from the after turret wrecked one of the Kingfisher observation floatplanes on its catapult on the fantail. The aircraft's volatile fuel exploded, igniting both floatplanes, until both were blown overboard by the second salvo. Firefighting teams were quickly on the scene to dowse the small fires left behind on the fantail, and they were extinguished in less than 30 seconds.
The battleship's gunnery officer then realised that the main battery directors were providing erroneous information, and it was discovered that the fire-control radars had not been re-aligned to true north following the electrical failure. All bearing information was therefore totally inaccurate, and the target that had been fired on astern appeared on the radars as being on the starboard beam.
South Dakota was once again rendered temporarily electronically blind as her technicians and radarmen strove to re-align the radars, but her position had been clearly revealed to the Japanese by her blazing floatplanes.
Kondo had led his main body southwest at 2330, and shortly after South Dakota had illuminated herself Atago turned starboard to due west. The only thing that prevented Kondo from opening fire at that time was uncertainty concerning the whereabouts of his own light forces. At 2349 he altered course again, to the north-northeast, and four minutes later searchlights stabbed out from Atago and Takao. The two brilliant beams converged on South Dakota.
Kondo immediately wheeled his ships to starboard to 120 degrees, an at 2355, with the range from Kirishima to South Dakota 14,000 yards, the three ships of the Japanese main body opened fire.
For the next five minutes South Dakota was the target for every Japanese gun that could bear, from the 14-inch of Kirishima through the 8-inch of Atago and Takao down to the 5-inch of the destroyers. Under this furious onslaught, she turned sharply away to port, while her starboard 5-inch batteries maintained a continuous fire at the Japanese searchlights.
Kirishima, however, managed only one 14-inch hit on South Dakota, on the barbette if No.3 16-inch turret. Atago and Takao did better, scoring 17 hits with their 8-inch guns, and there were numerous other hits from Kirishima's 6-inch secondary battery and the 5-inch guns of the cruisers and the destroyers.
Whole the hits prove the worth of the South Dakota's armour, they made a shambles of her superstructure, tore up radar and communications cables, shattered her radar plot, disabled her gun directors and destroyed four of her six fire-control radars.
Hits were obtained on the two Japanese cruisers, who obligingly doused their lights; no sooner had they done so, however, when an equally powerful beam from Kirishima settled on South Dakota. This finally gave South Dakota's forward main turrets a firm target, and just before midnight Kirishima was struck by at least two 16-inch projectiles; the searchlight was immediately extinguished.
While South Dakota was bearing the full brunt of the Japanese guns, Washington had sorted out her radar picture, and laid her sights squarely on Kirishima. None of the Japanese ships seemed to have spotted her, and it came as a rude shock to Kondo when precisely at midnight Washington sent a full 9-gun salvo arcing towards Kirishima at a range of only 9000 yards.
The Japanese main body ships immediately ceased firing on South Dakota as they sought out the new threat. The damaged American battleship seized the chance to turn back to starboard and reply to her tormentors, and for the next five minutes the two forces engaged each other hotly as they passed on reciprocal courses.
The Americans got by far the better of the exchange, however, with Washington hitting Kirishima with at least nine 16-inch shells and over forty 5-inch. South Dakota took on the two Japanese heavy cruisers, and scored a number of hits with both her main and secondary batteries. The Japanese, in return, scored no further hits on South Dakota and none at all on Washington.
At five midnights after midnight Kondo had had enough, and ordered the Bombardment Unit to turn 90 degrees to port; three minutes later he ordered another 90-degree turn, and by 0010 the two heavy cruisers were retiring northwest at 30 knots.
Kirishima, however, was unable to follow them. Her main steering had been wrecked, some of Washington's 16-inch shells had burst in her machinery spaces, and her topsides were wreathed in flame. She was in a similar condition to her sister two nights earlier, with the smaller-calibre American shells having wrought havoc in her towering superstructure and along her upper decks.
The mortally-wounded battleship began circling slowly to port, listing to starboard and down by the bows as tons of water poured in through the holes torn in her hull by Washington's heavy shells. Destroyers Asagumo and Teruzuki stayed with her, to either escort her to safety or take off her survivors - whichever became necessary.
All firing ceased on both sides as the Japanese Bombardment Unit turned away to port, and Lee instructed South Dakota to withdraw to the southwest; Gwin was ordered to stand by Benham, and follow the same route to safety, west of Guadalcanal.
Washington continued to the northwest at 28 knots, covering the withdrawal of the American cripples, and ready to engage the Japanese cruisers should they either turn in pursuit of South Dakota and the destroyers, or back toward Guadalcanal.
Kondo had no intention of doing either. His most powerful unit, Kirishima, had been knocked out of the fight in only 5 minutes, and the Japanese admiral was not going to risk his already damaged heavy cruisers against the awesome firepower of the American battleships. (He was unaware that South Dakota had been badly damaged and was retiring from the scene, and believed he was still opposed by two enemy battleships.)
Shortly before midnight the two Japanese cruiser-destroyer groups had turned away northwards to clear the range for the Bombardment Unit, with Nagara and her destroyers completing a full circle to starboard. They came out of the turn on a northwesterly heading, and passed down the port - disengaged - side of the main body; Kimura was preparing to station his ships astern of Kirishima when Kondo issued his order to turn away, whereupon Kimura reduced speed until the heavy cruisers caught up with him. Samidare was detached at 0010 to join the two destroyers standing by Kirishima, and Nagara took up a position on the port beam of Atago, expecting an order to carry out another torpedo attack on the enemy - but it was a long time coming.
Sendai and Shikinami turned starboard to parallel the Bombardment Unit about a mile on its port side just after midnight, then carried out the two turns away ordered by Kondo at 0005 and 0008. At 0010 the two ships crossed ahead of Atago then settled on a parallel course again, between Nagara and Atago.
At 0020 Lee ordered Washington to come 45 degrees to starboard, to 340, to see what the Japanese reaction would be. Kondo, when he received the report that the American battleship had turned towards, also altered course to 340, maintaining 30 knots. It appeared that the enemy was determined to resume the battle, but Kondo was just as determined to continue his withdrawal.
To cover his retirement, he ordered Kimura to carry out a torpedo attack, more as a deterrent to further pursuit than in any hope of scoring crippling or even mortal hits. At 0030 Kondo made his intentions patently clear to Lee when Atago and Takao, accompanied by Sendai and Shikinami, turned to the northeast - directly away from Washinton towards Indispensable Strait.
At the same time Nagara, who had closed to within 3 miles of Washington, led her three destroyers around to the north and prepared to launch torpedoes. Apparently Washington was totally absorbed with tracking Kondo's group, as she appeared not to be aware of Kimura's approach.
Just when the Japanese ships were preparing to launch their torpedoes, Washington reacted to Kondo's turn to the northeast by also turning to starboard. Thinking that this was a countermeasure in response to his imminent attack, Kimura held his fire and wheeled his ships to starboard as well; when the American battleship was seen to continue her turn all the way to due south, Kimura followed, but he was now in an unfavourable position for a torpedo attack, aft of the target's port beam.
Nevertheless, at 0038 Kimura gave the order for Hatsuyuki, Shirayuki and Inazuma to fire a half-salvo, although there was little chance of the Type 90 torpedoes, which had only a 7-knot speed advantage over their target, scoring a hit.
At this stage Washington became aware of the threat just abaft the port beam, and at 0040 she came 30 degrees to starboard. It was fortunate for her that she did, for more torpedoes - this time Long Lances - had been launched at her one minute earlier. These came from the north, from destroyers Kagero and Oyashio.
Away to the northwest, Rear-Admiral "Tenacious" Tanaka Raizo, in command of the destroyer escort of the troop convoy heading for Guadalcanal, had intercepted radio transmissions which indicated a surface battle taking place off Guadalcanal. He rightly assumed that Kondo had run into opposition, and had to suppress the urge to abandon the escorts and rush into battle with all his available destroyers. Instead he ordered Captain Sato Torajiro, commander of the 15th Destroyer Group in Oyashio, to take Kagero and "advance and attack the enemy" while the transports again turned away from Guadalcanal to await developments.
These two destroyers were 4½ miles northwest of Atago when that ship turned to the northeast at 0030, and they spotted Washington to the south-southeast soon after. Sato altered course to due south, then found himself on a collision course with another ship coming straight towards Oyashio.
There were some anxious moments before this ship identified herself as Nagara, and Sato was able to make the correct reply to her challenge. Then, as the light cruiser swung right as a result of Washington's turn, Sato wheeled his two ships to west and fired full salvoes of Long Lances after the retiring American battleship at 0039.
Some of these, and possibly some of those launched by Kimura's ships, exploded in Washington's wake; others were observed from the battleship passing down both sides, and these would definitely have been the 49-knot Long Lances from Oyashio and Kagero. At 0050, when all the torpedoes were clear ahead or had expired at the end of their runs, Lee turned Washington further starboard to 240 degrees and departed the area.
Kimura had broken off the chase and turned to follow Kondo at 0045, while Sato ahd headed off to the northwest a few minutes earlier. The only ships left in the battle area were Kirishima and the three destroyers standing by her.
Ayanami had been scuttled by torpedoes from Uranami at 0040, when it became obvious to her captain that she could not be saved. Under normal circumstances it might have been possible to tow her to safety, but the certainty of American air attacks at dawn put any thoughts of a slow towing operation out of the question. After taking off her crew and scuttling her sister, Uranami set off at full speed to the north.
Kirishima's commanding officer, Captain Iwabuchi Sanji, was pragmatic enough to realise that his ships would be a sitting duck for American aircraft, and he was not going to subject his crew to hours of futile agony as their ships was blasted to pieces around them as Hiei had been. At 0200 the crew of the battleship began transferring to the destroyers, and shortly after 0300 the seacocks were opened.
At 0325 Kirishima rolled over to starboard, capsized completely, and went to the bottom 7 miles northwest of Savo Island, not far from where her sister was last seen two nights earlier.
As Asagumo, Samidare and Teruzuki dug their sterns in and sped to the north, the waters that had seen so much action, death and destruction in the past 48 hours became deathly quiet. The two Naval Battles for Guadalcanal were over, and not one battleship shell had fallen on Henderson Field.